Regretfully, Yes May 22, 2008
Posted by Wu Ming in European Union, Irish Politics, Lisbon Treaty.trackback
The posters are up, opinion is shifting (or solidifying) and the campaign is entering its final stages. It seems opportune therefore to move on from simple criticism of Libertas (which seems to antagonise some of our more swashbuckling comrades) and other elements of the No campaign, and look the Treaty itself. Consider it a kind of ‘cards on the table’ moment.
Before exploring the pros and cons of Lisbon, it’s first necessary to dispel a couple of myths that have built up around it. Firstly, there’s a widespread belief that this Treaty is unreadable, impossible to understand (and deliberately designed to be so, if we are to lend credence to some of its more paranoid opponents). It really isn’t. Certainly, it’s no pageturner and is unlikely to find a place on airport bookshelves between the Tom Clancy and the Marian Keyes. However, it’s really no more complicated than any substantial piece of primary legislation, and the changes proposed are reasonably straightforward. What is true is that it’s impossible to understand what the Treaty changes without a copy of both the Treaty and the consolidated versions of the current Treaties in front of you. This, while irritating, is unavoidable and actually more transparent that voting on a single, consolidated document. It’s no different (other than in scale) to looking at what the Irish Constitution currently says when considering whether support any proposed amendment.
The other widespread myth, perpetuated by both the Yes and No campaigns is that the Lisbon Treaty makes substantial and far-reaching changes (for better or worse) to the operation of the European Union. It doesn’t. It’s not that significant at all. The changes introduced under Maastricht, Amsterdam and even Nice were far more radical than the limited amendments to operations currently being proposed. It introduces no new competences to the Union and is just the institutional cleaning-up exercise that some have described it as, resolving a number of outstanding issues which should have been resolved under Nice but on which it wasn’t possible to reach agreement in time for the 2004 Enlargement.
What is required to understand the Lisbon Treaty and its significance, however, is a basic grasp of the institutions of the European Union and how they operate. Given that it’s not a particularly interesting subject, it’s hardly surprising that it’s a subject on which quite a number of people (including some who might be expected to know better) are quite ignorant. This state of affairs is not new and, until recently, caused no difficulty for supporters of EU integration. They could simply point to the money rolling in and tell people vote for whichever Treaty was being ratified at the time. The problem now, of course, is that having fostered this kind of ignorance for so long, they’re unable to rely on a basic background knowledge on the part of the electorate which would allow it to distinguish a valid argument from a nonsensical one during the campaign. As you sow, etc.
So why a Yes vote, then? Simply put, I’m voting for the Lisbon Treaty because it represents an improvement, broadly, on the current institutional arrangements and enhances democratic accountability within the Union. It increases the power of the European Parliament in its ability to assent to or reject legislation prepared by the Commission. It gives effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights which, while not as substantial as it’s sometimes presented (it only applies to the institutions of the EU, or to the national implementation of EU legislation – not going to give us gay marriage, for example) is still a positive move in enshrining the fundamental rights of the individual in the Treaties. The Citizens’ Initiative which Lisbon introduces is a particularly interesting development; not only does it enhance the power of European citizens to hold the institutions of the Union to account, it also has the potential to begin to create a genuine transnational European political identity, as only a campaign on that scale and with that scope could mobilise the numbers necessary to have any petition recognised under the Initiative.
Much time and energy has been given over to the discussion of the relative voting strength of Ireland under the proposed revised QMV system, with quite a bit of heat but very little light. Reverting for the moment to the point about knowledge of how the Union works being important in this debate, the fact that so much focus has been given to the QMV issue does show a complete overestimation of the extent to which any decision would go to a vote under the present rules, including in situations where QMV currently applies. That said, however, there does appear to be something of a disconnect between the demands for great democratic accountability within the Union and opposition to changes to the QMV system. Once the principle that certain decisions be taken by QMV is conceded – and it has – then it’s difficult to see how one can object to moves towards a system where equal consideration is given to all EU citizens, and where votes in Council are weighted accordingly. If one was to introduce QMV now and was developing the system from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance I would suggest that the system emerging from the process would resemble the Lisbon proposals far more than it would the current arrangement.
I do remain unconvinced of the merits of some aspects of the Treaty, the permanent President of the European Council being a case in point. Leaving aside the fact that this isn’t quite the new position that some like Libertas seem to think it is (Nicolas Sarkozy will be the President of that body in about six weeks), it’s not at all clear what added value a permanent (well, semi-permanent) independent President would bring. The role of the European Council itself is rather limited, certainly in legislative terms, and the President doesn’t currently wield any significant power other than political clout (this being as much a function of their domestic position – depending on the incumbent – as of the fact that they chair two meetings in a six-month period). Additionally, given the fact that the rotation of Presidencies between Member States is being retained in the Council of the European Union (apart from the Foreign Affairs formation) the new position of President could potentially prove to be an obstacle to the smooth running of the Union at its highest levels, as opposed to providing the continuity and consistency that’s often suggested. It might, therefore, have been best if this proposal had been dropped at the same time as they did away with the flag and the anthem from the Constitution; like those it’s just another hangover from Vichy collaborationist Giscard d’Estaing’s dreams of Convention glory. However, it’s still not quite strong enough a flaw to swing me towards a ‘No’ position.
Speaking of which, it would be refreshing if a little more honesty was employed in discussions about the consequences of a No vote. It has been said that the cases of France and Holland are useful comparisons here: they voted No to the Constitution, and nothing happened to them. True, to a extent, but to labour a rather obvious point, Ireland is neither France nor Holland and, from the perspective of national interests (if one actually cares about such things) Ireland is far more dependent on the goodwill of other Member States than France or Holland are. On this point, Brian Cowen is actually correct. If Ireland votes No to this Treaty, and blocks the implementation of its provisions in the face of overwhelming support from the administrations of virtually all other Member States, it would seriously affect the ability of Irish officials to gain sympathy for the Irish position in a host of other fora, discussions on the future of the CAP being an obvious example.
This is not, in itself, a particularly strong reason for voting Yes and it’s certainly not a pretty or principled one. It is, however, an honest one. It’s a nonsense to suggest, as Sinn Féin does, for example, that voting No would allow for the negotiation of a ‘better deal’ for Ireland. On what basis do they think that other Member States would be in any mood to bend over backwards to appease the electorate of this country – a country which needs the EU far more than the EU needs it? What would happen is simply what happened with the Nice referenda: a few declarations here and there adding essentially nothing and a rerun of the campaign. To those who suggest that a rejection of the Treaty would not only not damage Ireland’s standing within the Union but would, in fact, enhance it I would simply say the following. Get real.
Finally, questions about the primacy given to competition and free markets, about transparency of decision-making or about the disbursement of EU funding are, to a great extent, valid ones and deserve to be addressed. However, they are not questions that are relevant to this particular debate. There is no better or improved EU on offer if the Lisbon Treaty is rejected. We don’t have a choice between Lisbon and Lisbon Plus, between Lisbon and the Programme of the Left Opposition or between Lisbon and the Democratic Programme of the First Dáil. It’s a flat choice between Lisbon and the current institutional framework. For the reasons I’ve argued above Lisbon is, in my view, an improvement on the only alternative currently on the table. A slight improvement, perhaps, but an improvement nonetheless. And it’s for that reason, above all, that I will be voting, regretfully, Yes.
wbs: why the name change? Your style is a dead giveaway.
I think you’re right in most of the details of the text, but your presentation of it is quite devoid of context and amounts to a simple textual analysis rather than the institutional analysis which is, of course, the important thing. It doesn’t really matter what the text means, the important thing is what is going to be done with it. This requires one to examine the process by which the treaty was formed to discover the reasons for the changes and their sources. Every line in the treaty is there for a reason and has a purpose. People have put them there because they want to be able to do specific stuff that they can’t do, or is currently difficult to do. A very great deal of this information is in the public domain and is relatively easy to discover. It is merely protected by the fact that almost nobody who isn’t a participant looks at the various strategic documents that are issued by the various think-tanks, governments and euro-bodies who contribute to EU decision making. For example, the white-paper on strategy that the French government are postponing until after June 12th will be a simple restatement of the same thing that the French state has been saying since 1945, updated only in the details. It is being postponed because it is full of bald statements of things that flatly contradict many of the things that the government would like to give us different impressions about.
To explain a little more by example. Your claim that the treaty is not particularly difficult to understand. Firstly, it is over 300 pages consisting purely of amendments to a collection of different documents which are all written in dense legalese. I think that by any normal standard, digesting and understanding such a document is difficult. Yourself, who has been involved in politics for a long time, or myself, who works on research projects based around the abstract modelling of policy, might find it easy enough to read such text, but for most people it’s extraordinarily difficult.
But, even if we accept your opinion that the treaty is readable, there is still a massive chasm between being readable and being understandable. You use the example of a constitutional amendment as a comparison. Constitutional amendments typically involve the modification, insertion, or removal of a few paragraphs. Even then, they routinely have all sorts of unpredicted consequences, even to the collective intelligence of the legal experts who have put them together. Constitutions change so slowly because it is impossible to understand their consequences fully – not on paper, but in reality, how they will be applied and to what effect.
In this situation, it’s very rash indeed to claim an understanding of the significance of Lisbon. To do so without even looking at the forces at play and their motives is to imagine that texts have some importance in themselves. They don’t. It’s what they allow people to do that’s significant. Even those who drafted the treaty for the government will admit that they have only the vaguest idea of what it will all mean in practice.
So, in sum, your analysis, like the entire public debate, is entirely devoid of context. Efficiency has no meaning by itself, it needs a direction. Efficient decision making is only desirable if there are particular decisions that you want to make. The only way to undestand any of this stuff is to look at the forces at play and to try to understand what they are trying to do – and when you do look it’s not all that complicated and involves no conspiracies at all, just people trying to doing the stuff that they more or less say they want to do. It is, unfortunately, just completely missing from the debate.
Well put. And I particularly like your comment on the President and that there will be a continue rotation of the Council. That struck me as bizarre.
I too will be voting Yes. I am pleased that the national parliaments will be given a role – which is far more limited than many on the Yes side would have us believe. Yet the very fact that national parliaments are being pulled into the process is welcome, even if their formal power is limited to the ‘yellow card’ issue of subsidiarity and being a check on the passerelle process. It may lead to a slightly better oversight.
In the end I would agree that this is a refinement of the institutions, a small but significant nod towards more democracy, and overall a significant clarification. Plus there are sensible additions such as the cross border cooperation on terrorism, drugs, etc, which so far Ireland has opted out of.
Lisbon has prompted me to ask, ok how far should integration go? My answer is, not much further. At least for the moment. Though I’m very much an admirer of the EU and how it has evolved, I am very sensitive to the notions of mission creep and institutional momentum.
I think for various reasons, much of them above and beyond the power of the EU, the various peoples have become way more negative and skeptical. There will be a challenge in the coming years to maintain the Union’s legitimacy, especially if harsh decisions are to be made. National governments may not be willing to take the medicine and may play populist politics in facing down certain EU decisions. One example where this nearly came to a head, and may still do, is relating to the deficit requirement. In the end, the criteria were watered down. If the big economies continue to have difficulty in the current global climate, who knows what crises lie around the corner. And with a more skeptical populace, facing down the Eu would be politically easier.
All of which is why the EU proponents have lost a great deal in not making efforts over recent years to help people understand the EU, its necessity, its achievements and so on. As some-one pointed out, we only get this in the weeks before a referendum.
Finally, I fully agree that Ireland’s influence will depend more on building good will, alliances, and strategies, than it will on QMV rules. And that is why a No, after a decade of wrangling and compromise, would burn off a huge amount of our political euro-capital.
Good discussion! Sometimes it’s worth wading through the long paragraphs…
I would accept most of what Wu Ming writes, but I wonder about her/his blunt assertion that the treaty does not make “substantial and far-reaching changes”. In particular, the “militarization” allegations from various quarters — are they all rubbish? I’ll look elsewhere for enlightenment.
Pace Chekov, I don’t detect WorldbyStorm’s hand. So who is this Wu Ming?
Anything to do with these people…?
http://www.wumingfoundation.com/english/biography.html
Niave and fluff understanding of the Treaty and the direction of europe.
Whatever else about the EU, this treaty is a clear disimprovement for ireland, we lose significant amounts of our institutional power and transfer other powers to politicans and officials that we have no ability to influence or ultimately remove from power.
Your arguments just reek of a eurogroupie social democrat apologetic handshake.
[...] Great piece on the Lisbon Treaty over at the Cedar Lounge. [...]
Chekov, that’s actually not me – I’ve been working on the HP interview with Ciaran Cannon having got my hands on a copy of HP yesterday. But I’m flattered (I think) nonetheless that you’d think it was me.
And as it happens I’m a lot more indifferent to Lisbon (although on the day I’ll most likely vote yes – current personal circumstances permitting), for better than worse than our contributor above and have no reason not to be entirely open about my feelings one way or another under the handle WBS, not least because who really gives a toss about my opinion?
Still, that said, cards on the table, my own take is – and I mentioned this over at Machine Nation yesterday – that I’m a bit tired of the claims of the Yes side that all will be great and the claims of the No side that all will be desperate. I’ve thirty odd years of hearing same from both sources and what I see beyond those claims is a fairly process based dynamic rooted in dull structures that while there are strong positive aspects seem to lack clear cut means of enthusing those beyond them which is a profound negative. End of the world or heaven on earth? Nah, neither. Existential threat to our sovereignty? Precursor to a global human rights champion? Right wing conspiracy? Left wing social experimentation gone mad? None of the above.
I’ve moved from strong – and often uncritical – support for the European project to a situation where thus far and not much further suits me well enough. If it goes through, fine, if it doesn’t I’ll lose no sleep at all.
Indifferently, yes?
And while I’m at it there are contributors (both posters and commentators, although sometimes those distinctions seem a bit blurred
) here who would – I’m certain – take a strong No line. I look forward to seeing their thoughts posted up…
Whatever else about the EU, this treaty is a clear disimprovement for ireland, we lose significant amounts of our institutional power and transfer other powers to politicans and officials that we have no ability to influence or ultimately remove from power.
Your arguments just reek of a eurogroupie social democrat apologetic handshake.
Some examples would probably have sufficed in place of the final paragraph.
As for Wu Ming, do I understand that this is a development of the Luther Blissett gag?
I tend to agree that the changes will not be that significant in practice, if only because of how far we’ve gone toward the dilution of national sovereignty and neutrality already and the apathy of this country’s leadership towards same, which means even in the areas that we retain the veto or the limited voting power we have at present, they are unlikely to actually make much use of them. That doesn’t, in my opinion, justify willingly handing them over anyway.
The “citizen’s initiative” is so incredibly weak I find it almost insulting that the Yes side think it’s a real argument in favour – and as for it having the power to create a “genuine transnational European political identity”, eh, so what? Even assuming that’s true, which I wouldn’t be at all certain of, why is that necessarily a good thing?
Finally, questions about the primacy given to competition and free markets, about transparency of decision-making or about the disbursement of EU funding are, to a great extent, valid ones and deserve to be addressed. However, they are not questions that are relevant to this particular debate.
So when are they going to be addressed? They certainly won’t be if the Irish people vote yes. Do you really imagine we can come back to these issues later? For those of us who think the whole European project has unacceptably enshrined the principle of free market capitalism and unaccountable bureaucratic political control, this is the only chance we have to make those arguments. The political reality is that a referendum on an EU treaty is a referendum on the fundamental direction the EU is taking and not merely on the details of the treaty itself. It’s the only such referendum we get and anyone with concerns about that direction is just foolish not to use the opportunity.
Checkov,
You make a very valid point about the difficulty in ascertaining now what will be the precise consequences of the measures in Lisbon. It is very true that it is often hard to tell. Furthermore, your point about various interests having an input is well taken. The exent of the lobbying within the EU is often mentioned, but its exact impact on people is far more difficult to tell.
Regarding the difficulty in predicting consequences. It is true that any legal or institutional change can have unintended effects. Yet you have to attempt to look at how each instrument is framed and make an educated guess as to the likely consequences. True, political scientists could mull over a phrase for a decade writing papers, but in reality politics has to keep moving (though hopefully if a consensus on an issue emerges from the science its wisdom can be absorbed into the political process). But if we waited on a definitive theoretical analysis of each change, national or european, we would still be sitting waiting on the debate to end on the possible consequences of the Treaty of Rome. When we entered the single market and then monetary Union, it would have been very difficult to predict the long term consequences (this reminds me of the famous phrase about the French revolution). But in the end, we have to make a best guess. In that sense, Lisbon I believe, has nothing in it that can have be seen later as a major shift in direction in the same way as some previous Treaties. But of course, I could be proved wrong.
Regarding the fact that each line in the Treaty serves a purpose. Well, yes, but that is not the same as saying behind each line lies a conspiracy of interests. If we look at the existing body of Treaties, we cannot detect that each line was serving some purpose which led us blindly in unforseen directions to serve particular interests. True, in the main, some significant provisions can be seen to reflect particular interests, but not each line. Some lines are there because national politicians wanted them there to protect their national interests. For example, the Danish opt out on Property in I think Mastricht. Or the Irish clause on abortion. And so on. So the ‘each line’ thing is too reductionist.
Rather than fear the consequences of each line, I would rather highlight the fact that whereas in a national government, or certainly in Ireland, the various lobbys at work are more transparent. We know about the construction industry, the IFA, the unions, the publicans, IBEC or whatever. And we can at least see to a certain extent what is going on, how the clash of influences in some areas results in compromises that are not too sinister whrereas in other areas, say construction, you could say that there hasn’t been a balancing lobby effective in reigning it in.
But for the average Irish, or French or Latvian, person, it is impossible to ’see’ what is going on in Brussels and to ascertain what agendas are being played out. Nor is it easy to see what kind of nod and wink has been made between France and Germany, regarding an issue which forwards their interest at the expense of everyone else.
But I’m not sure and haven’t given enough thought yet to what if anything can be done about these issues.
[...] Thoughtful lisbon debate. [...]
Does anyone seriously believe that a ‘No’ vote by the Irish would be the end of the Lisbon treaty?
not after the last one
Firstly, apols to WBS for the mistaken attribution, I recant!
There is one other point that I’d like to make about the debate here – it is shockingly insular. I mean it is all about “is it good for Ireland”, “what do we get out of it” and so on. Virtually none of it is coming from the point of view of “as EU citizens are we happy with the direction our federal state is going”. And the truth of the matter is that in terms of EU decision making Ireland as a political entity is completely irrelevant. The two areas that the government cares about – taxation and the CAP – are entirely dependant on the British and French states. Whatever about the institutional arrangements and voting rights, the only thing that is preventing the EU from closing down this offshore tax haven is the UK. It simply doesn’t matter what the Irish government says or does, they are almost totally irrelevant in terms of EU strategy, leeches on the side of the Union.
If we see ourselves as a national unit, fighting for our share of the pie in the EU we’ve committed ourselves to a fight that we can only lose – we’re pawns in the game of much greater powers. The only way for us to have any meaningful input is to see ourselves for what we are, a tiny fraction of the citizenry of a federal state in formation. To have any say in the decisions of this state, we need to mobilise as European citizens, and look at such referenda not from a nationalist view point (because the ruling class certainly don’t), but as Europeans being asked to approve the direction of their state.
Incidentally, to answer CL’s question – I don’t think you can rule it out actually. Not because anybody gives a damn what the leaders of an irritating insular offshore tax haven say, they don’t, but because of the ramifications it could have elsewhere. In the UK the atlanticist wing of the ruling class is immensely more powerful than they are here. An Irish defeat would be a real shot in the arm for them and it’s not beyond the bounds of possibility that the labour government could fall in the not too distant future, ushering in a tory government full of euro-skeptics and nato representatives.
why vote yes wbs?
A combination of things, and these are entirely personal, they’re not some overarching rationale that others need to see as good bad or indifferent or convincing or otherwise. Behind it all is a belief in engagement and the necessity to find new territory on which to progress a left agenda. The idea that aspects of the left appear instinctively averse to the EU puzzles me. It’s like being instinctively averse to the Irish political structures, not in the sense of their form which should be open to question, but in their existence. Sure, we want to change them but we can’t wish them away, and indeed they offer an opportunity to promote our thoughts (and in a way I think look at the trajectory of RSF to see how successful those who refuse to engage actually are).
But for some more concrete reasons…Firstly, the nature of some of those on the No side, the monkey poster is a giveaway there (sorry, that’s a legacy of the past, but so be it). Secondly the sense that the only way the left can improve Europe is by being inside it, rather than camping outside it hoping against hope that suddenly the scales will fall from peoples eyes and in some nebulous way it will just ‘change’. It won’t, they won’t. Capitalism – albeit of a social democratic bent – is built into the DNA of Europe, it’s not going to go away by sitting on the sidelines. But the Charter of Fundamental Rights is introduced, and weak and all as it as Wu Ming notes, that’s a step forward and should be the basis for the left to argue for the extension of further rights. Not just that but the CI is a potential means of raising uncomfortable issues for the economic liberal consensus. Thirdly the fact that Lisbon finally introduces a secession process. Fourthly, as I noted above, the sense that thus far and a little further. Fifth: a belief that Europe can provide a counterweight internationally to the US, but again, that depends on the left pitching in and working it.
Finally, the alternative? The status quo ante? I’m no more wedded to that than Wu Ming. But moreover I suspect that the atlanticists that Chekov refers to would be delighted with that. And despite all that the EU will continue. Perhaps in the shape of a two speed Europe which could potentially be much more detrimental to our interests than the current set up or that proposed under Lisbon.
So, no catastrophe, whatever the outcome, but enough to push me across the line.
I’d agree with a lot of what WBS says. There have been some benefits in Europe for workers, particularly in the UK and the Republic, where some measure of protection and extension of rights in certain areas have been afforded. And this has been because of the strong social democratic tradition on the continent.
However, I disagree with him on a number of points. I think the space for that type of progress has been exhausted, or virtually exhausted. Recent legal decisions (such as the case involving the Latvian company) demonstrate this, and we no longer here any discussion of the social Europe, but rather the Europe of free movement of capital and the free market exclusively. This has been the case for many years now.
I had the argument about siding with the right wing against the treaty recently. I reject the idea that because Youth Defence is in favour of something the left must oppose it completely. It makes no sense. Nor do we have to work with them, and if the treaty were rejected for the wrong reasons, it would still be a good result.
I agree that much of the debate is overblown, but there are important things in this treaty that cannot be ignored. Obviously the continuing concern over sovereignty. Primary for Ireland is the issue of neutrality. Even if Irish troops will not be engaged in imperialist adventures themselves, Irish taxpayers will be helping fund them. I am also highly dubious about the idea that we should upgrade the army because the EU says so. Total waste of money. Completely.
I also seriously doubt that the EU can ever be a counterweight to the US. Not while the UK is a major player in it anyway, nor while the former socialist states look to it for alliances. On the contrary, it will be dragged further into supporting US foreign policy.
So not the end of the world, but still a serious issue that needs to be defeated.
Wu Ming wrote: “It gives effect to the Charter of Fundamental Rights which, while not as substantial as it’s sometimes presented (it only applies to the institutions of the EU, or to the national implementation of EU legislation – not going to give us gay marriage, for example) is still a positive move in enshrining the fundamental rights of the individual in the Treaties. The Citizens’ Initiative which Lisbon introduces is a particularly interesting development; not only does it enhance the power of European citizens to hold the institutions of the Union to account, it also has the potential to begin to create a genuine transnational European political identity, as only a campaign on that scale and with that scope could mobilise the numbers necessary to have any petition recognised under the Initiative.”
I think the important point here is that “the Charter of fundamental rights” clearly introduces no new competences to the Union and that it is subordinate to other, less feel-good, areas of the treaty. Areas which mean new, more vigorous, attacks on public services particularly in health and education.
For instance such as new neoliberal advances, i.e. in Protocol 6 (The Protocol on the Internal Market & Competition) on ‘undistorted competition’ and Article 16(b) with new ‘economic and financial conditions on the provision of Services of General Economic Interest’, meaning under current EU law services such as health care and education will be subject to the rules of competition. But if you don’t have problem with that then….
Of course then there’s mandatory increased militarisation. In terms of the environment you have contradictions such as required motorway spending and continuing of the fishing policy etc. All are not subordinate to the Charter of fundamental rights, which, as I said, introduces no new competences to the Union
Then there’s the changes to the EU foreign and trade policies which are damaging to developing nations in terms of development (such as the intended removal of all developing world trade barriers, which is extremely damaging as shown by similar from the IMF and World Bank) and future ‘peaceful interventions’.
Another fig-lef in the treaty/the-rehashed-constitution is the Citizens Initiative. It sounds great however, the Commission is not ‘legally bound’ to do anything with it, other than, you know, to consider it. It is an irrelevancy.
Finally, the treaty has absolutely no bearing on climate change -that’s just another figleaf. There’s nothing new there. If anything, surely any impartial look at it, would clearly show it to be deleterious to any action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?
Even if Irish troops will not be engaged in imperialist adventures themselves
Arguably they already are, but anyway, you certainly can’t rely on the triple lock keeping them out forever, not with a second-largest party that is quite open about its desire to end what vestiges of neutrality remain.
hoping against hope that suddenly the scales will fall from peoples eyes and in some nebulous way it will just ‘change’. It won’t, they won’t.
It certainly won’t if we keep accepting everything they throw at us.
Wednesday,
I agree. Just admitting it for the sake of argument. The privitisation point raised by Pax is a vital issue that to my shame I forgot about.
a counter to the US, in that we’ll get our own bit of the middle east (oil)(again)?
it seems you do see a no vote as a catastrophe otherwise you wouldn’t be compelled to vote at all.
steve, that’s a neat line in putting words in my mouth.
Where have I mentioned middle east oil and why try to cast my argument in terms of it?
Why should I be boxed in by your ‘logic’ to a choice between a No or a catastrophe? That’s – frankly – unfair. We make many choices in life between the good and the less good. Catastrophe doesn’t enter into it. None of the arguments I have put forward as bringing me to where I am are about catastrophe, they’re about balancing a whole range of issues. No big deal.
Wednesday, we can’t even shape responses sufficient to prevent the hegemony of economic liberalism in this state. To think we can somehow leverage the EU is simply unfeasible (and arguably undemocratic, although that’s a different discussion). Nor is it a case of accepting everything ‘they’ throw at us. The RoI was locked into the process of negotiation on this for years prior to this. This is an agreed document, a flawed one, but agreed nonetheless.
I’m much less certain than you that public opinion would accept the removal of neutrality. But if it winds up as the outcome of a political process openly arranged then I’d accept it. I don’t see the point of the exercise to pit Lisbon against possible or not moves by Fine Gael at some unspecified time in the future, and moreover that’s a national problem that the left would have to deal with, not Europe.
Personally I’d like to see NATO gone, and then a defensive agreement between EU states (which is not quite what Lisbon offers). Otherwise the triple lock such as it is suffices.
Garibaldy, some good points which if I can I’ll take individually.
How can we be sure the space is exhausted if our response is not to engage, if the default position of many on the left is suspicion of the project in its entirety?
Re YD, that may be a function of my own political struggles, but so be it. Their win is a loss for us in a world where the right particularly in its ultra incarnations seems to be in the ascendant.
Sovereignty and neutrality are not primarily of concern to me, insofar as the latter remains locked in to UN mandates and the former, well, I’m a leftist, I’m not overly concerned about sovereignty as long as it can be exercised where necessary (hence my strong belief in a means of leaving the EU).
I think upgrading the army is actually a good idea, but for very clear roles which would again have to be mandated by the UN. Which is the situation as it stands and will be barring some unfeasible change of policy. That some monies may help fund adventures? Well, will they? Nkedly imperialist adventures are very much out of style. But, Lisbon passed or Lisbon not passed how will that be avoided one way or another? If we’re out we have no influence, no means of building alliances to prevent the EU from taking that path.
The EU is already a counterweight to the US, although nowhere near as strong a one as it could potentially be. The EU has its own interests and to some limited extent speaks as with one voice to the world on certain issues. That it has a mildly social democratic tinge is de facto in opposition to the US philosophically and in terms of outcomes. It may be that such a role is limited by the very nature of the EU which is a pooled/shared sovereignty of individual nation states (we can all list off where individual national stances have weakened shared approaches say on Palestine/Israel, etc, etc). So be it. Better that messy flawed sort of a construct than some of the alternatives.
And defeated to what purpose? What is Plan B? How does that impact on our very real national interests? We’re not Cuba, which after the fall of the USSR was able to turn to the EU to make up some of the shortfall. Who do we as a nation turn to?
Nor is it a case of accepting everything ‘they’ throw at us. The RoI was locked into the process of negotiation on this for years prior to this. This is an agreed document, a flawed one, but agreed nonetheless.
By “we” I meant the left, not the Free State and I think in some respects what you say about the hegemony of economic liberalism here only proves my point. I mean a large part of the reason the ruling classes want this treaty is precisely because it reinforces economic liberalism. That is the EU they have created, that is the direction they intend for it to go in and that is what we are being asked to sign up to. It may indeed be unlikely that we can reverse this course by voting No, but there is absolutely no chance of doing so by voting Yes. None. The vote will be taken as a vote of confidence in the present direction of the EU and frankly that’s the only logical way it can be read.
Obviously I don’t think Fine Gael are the only threat to neutrality, with or without the passage of the Treaty, but I wouldn’t dismiss them so lightly. I’m not suggesting an FG government would be able to discard neutrality at a stroke but of course they would push the envelope as far as they could – and given the erosion by stealth that’s already being tolerated, I have less faith than you in the power of public opinion to stop it.
I’m a leftist, I’m not overly concerned about sovereignty
I cannot for the life of me see how Point B follows from Point A in that sentence.
FWIW, at my volunteer gig this morning the subject of the Treaty came up and everyone who expressed any kind of view on it seemed to be undecided/leaning towards no. Grounds of not understanding it, not thinking the Yes side is putting a real case forward, not liking the subtle intimations that’s it’s going to go ahead whatever happens on June 12th. None of these people would be party political, but I’d guess most of them as Labour or Green voters.
Two quick points, Wednesday, a bit under the cosh today. Firstly you’re absolutely right and I can only plead the earliness I wrote it as an excuse, but of course I meant my own brand of leftism. Not sure why it is, poss a function of WP internationalism, and this doesn’t mean I’m not interested by issues of sovereignty.
Secondly, I take your point re your first point, but I still come down on the side of believing that your assertion that:
“It may indeed be unlikely that we can reverse this course by voting No, but there is absolutely no chance of doing so by voting Yes. None. The vote will be taken as a vote of confidence in the present direction of the EU and frankly that’s the only logical way it can be read.”, particularly the bit about ‘ there is absolutely no chance of doing so by voting Yes’. There is as equal a validity in my opinion as saying that by saying Yes and engaging through alliances etc we can build support for a more social Europe.
I see it broadly this way, and this is why I was loath to enter this discussion. People on all sides have sincerely held views on these issues. I won’t, and don’t intend to change minds on it, and those leaning towards a No won’t change mine. That said, since Wu Ming hasn’t responded to the points made I thought it only fair to throw in my tuppence ha’penny worth.
WBS,
I’ve no problem with engaging, and fighting hard in European elections and on the commission etc. But it doesn’t mean that while doing it you agree with every reform designed to grant it more power. I guess a parallel could be drawn with the role of council managers in the south, where they are determining far too much. Doesn’t mean we should boycott or ignore the councils, but we should try to curb the power of the managers and resist the expansion of their powers. I guess it’s about the democratic deficit.
On the army. I’m not sure having seen the last 15 years how you can say nakedly imperialist adventures are not around anymore. Just the justificatory story has changed to human rights (but funnily enough, only where countries are opposed to a certain way of running things dmoestically and internationally). I’ve said we should withdraw, but again it is an either/or.
As for why this should be defeated. To protect us from having a further privisation agenda imposed on us by EU structures, and to preserve as much independence as possible (which chimes in with how I interpret WP internationalism
).
On the counterweight, it has acted like that up to a point, but that does not automatically mean it will act in a progressive way, as can be seen in Kosovo or elsewhere.
I don’t think the EU will ever be the superstate some fear (certainly not in my lifetime). But then again, if you look at the role of an economic union in the original creation of modern Germany, then it’s a danger that the drive towards a central policy could move beyond limits that seem sensible to most people.
Just to make a counter point to the increasing nationalism argument. During the week Pat Kenny had Tony Benn on, opposite Brian Lenihan and himself.*
It really was Benn Vs Lenihan and Kenny as Pat was his usual biased self (very Yes to Lisbon), but it was more transparent here.
The 83 year old, Benn, as eloquent as ever, put forth the argument that if the EU continues on its current route it could actually increase nationalism, not lessen it. Which makes perfect sense when you think about it, with the decrease in democracy, the increase in neoliberalism and attending apathy, authoritarianism and militarism etc….
It all made me think of the former Yugoslavia somehow…
*
(to listen, scroll down to – “Shows from the past week” – “Monday” – and it starts 10mins in,
http://www.rte.ie/radio1/todaywithpatkenny/
Garibaldy, again I should be more clear, I think since Iraq the limitations of naked force have been demonstrated very clearly. And in fairness to the EU it has tended in the main to go for non-violent approaches (the hames in Kosovo – which I also agree with your point as regards how it doesn’t necessarily have to have a progressive face – was because it didn’t bloody well live up to its own rhetoric on pooling sovereignty, etc, etc…). Re privatisation. I don’t read it as forcing us any more down that road, and I’d like to see a strong sustained effort inside the EU to push back on precisely that issue. If anything I think the terrain is probably better now than it has been in decades to do so. Consider how even in the US state intervention is now more acceptable (albeit by stealth, but consider the health insurance issue, etc,) that it has been well… since who knows when.
I agree with you completely re the superstate issue, and nor would I want it to be one.
Pax, I like Benn, and I’ve heard that argument before, and it strikes me as simply wrong. If Lisbon is passed states can secede. So how precisely does the Yugoslavia issue come into play? And if he genuinely believes it then how on earth does he expect any supranational socialist institutions to ever work?
The problem with the rolling it back from the inside argument is that these things pass into law with the treaty, and they are a pain in the ass to get out of without pulling out, with all the consequences of that. Which is exactly what the system relies upon of course. Pull out, and watch your economy collapse as tariff walls go up pour encourager les autres. In the UK and Ireland, the mood may (and I stress may) be against further privitisation, but look at France and to eastern Europe where private is seen as the way to go – certainly by the political elite.
There is as equal a validity in my opinion as saying that by saying Yes and engaging through alliances etc we can build support for a more social Europe.
I honestly cannot imagine how you think a Yes is going to facilitate that.
The 83 year old, Benn, as eloquent as ever, put forth the argument that if the EU continues on its current route it could actually increase nationalism, not lessen it.
I missed what Benn had to say, unfortunately, but the fact is we’ve been told for decades that European integration would be the death knell for nationalism and that doesn’t seem to be happening at all. Although it does seem to be the case that some supranationalisms are diminishing; I’m thinking particularly of increased support for Scottish independence and for the breakup of Belgium. I wouldn’t find it at all surprising if both those trends were due to competition from the EU for supranational allegiance.
Really? Not at all?
Your second point is very interesting. It seems that Scotland, like Ireland before it, sees the EU in positive terms and not as a threat, but instead as an enabler for independence. Which certainly does align with your point that some supranationalisms are decreasing. Another way of looking at it is that nationalisms don’t in practice seem to be diminished by the EU. Which isn’t that odd, since a federal EU still seems, as G and I were discussing earlier, remote.
Yes, not at all.
The irony of course being that as “independence” becomes more achievable under the EU, it simultaneously becomes less meaningful…
I wouldn’t read too much into the SNP’s victory. I can’t see a referendum being won, and I think the fact that the SNP hasn’t pushed heavily for one to be called one is indicative of that. I think its victory was of the totally fed-up with the guys in power sort. But unlike the rest of the UK, the Scottish voters had no inclination to swing to the Tories. As for Belgium, an odd situation, that may well come down to language and cultural rights. I once heard Norman Porter say that he thought by a postnationalist Europe maybe Hume meant a Europe of the regions. Maybe he’ll be right.
As for Benn HUGELY overrated.
As for Belgium, an odd situation, that may well come down to language and cultural rights.
There’s nothing really odd about that. Those are the things that feed nationalist disputes all over the world.
I find it interesting that some people who think eliminating nationalism from Europe is inherently a good thing actually seem to want to replace all the different nationalisms with a single European nationalism. If you start from the premise that nationalism itself is a problem – and I don’t, obviously – then aren’t you just transferring the “problem” from one frontier to another?
I don’t know Wednesday, I think that’s a huge point of philosophical difference between our world views, I simply don’t weight ‘independence’ in the way you do. I see it as ‘real’ in a sense and necessary, but difficult to gauge in an inter-dependent world. And therefore, an EU of independent nation states pooling/sharing sovereignty provides no contradiction to me. Or let me put it a different way. I simply don’t believe that the RoI is less independent in any meaningful way than it was in 1972. In some respects I think EU membership extended RoI independence finally allowing it to break decisively with the UK and take on a more internationalist hue. I’ve lived through that period here and the change has been enormous, both in psychological terms and political terms. Incidentally, one of the most interesting points as regards that psychology was when the link with sterling was broken. That was a watershed.
Garibaldy, I’d agree in the short term re Scottish independence. Mid-term? Not so sure.
I certainly hope post-nationalist doesn’t mean regional. And there I’d entirely line up with you guys – i.e. the No camp.
Very much agree re Benn. A nice and sincere man, but.. somehow not fully convincing.
Wednesday,
I meant that there seems no real reason as to why we should see the flowering of a move for the dismemberment of Belgium now as opposed to say 10 years ago. And by coming down to I meant to say be fixed by, but didn’t express myself clearly.
WBS, mid term in Scotland, we’ll see. It might well go either way, but the economic downturn makes it less likely I should think.
There’s no reason to believe that strengthening the EU will lead to a stronger left and promote a more ’social’ Europe: it could lead to a stronger right.
Very possibly, but to invert Wednesday’s argument, we clearly won’t know unless we try and it definitely won’t happen if the left doesn’t attempt it.
G, just thinking, isn’t it possible that with a disconnect between Scotland and England under a very possible near future Tory UK govt that independence might well appeal more broadly?
I think they have enough power devolved to protect themselves from the worst of Tory interventions, but maybe you’re right.
It’s a bit like the North though. A fair bit too much depends on London playing ball and ‘allowing’ the institutions to remain extant.
Well indeed. Although I don’t think the Tories would pull the plug as too blatantly democratic. More likely they will seek to reduce the power of Scottish and Welsh and NI MPs at Westminster.
Yeah, that would make sense. That said there still seems to be a rump inside the Conservatives that would have a worrying adherence to the old days.
Yeah. And Cameron and co are among them, despite their efforts to suggest otherwise. Rather than fuzzy social democrats, they are the hard right in sheep’s clothing. As Boris will soon demonstrate. But we can hope that one term will be enough to show it, but I suspect that from now on, governments will be in place for at least 10 years. The electorate seems to be moving that way.
That’s something I hadn’t thought about as such, but yes, it does seem a dynamic and not merely in Ireland and the UK but across Europe and the US. Why?
I think it’s so much of the swing vote going one way. It only breaks off in segments, and over a longer period of time. At the same time, the breakdown of party structures beyond Parliament makes rebuilding from opposition that much more difficult, and effectively you have to wait until the tide turns due to exhaustion and boredom with the government. I think this has been the case with both the UK and Fine Gael, except in the free state, that has not yet happened.
WBS, I’d see that as effectively transferring from one dependency to another. It may be more subtle these days but in view of the statistic that something like 75-80% of our legislation comes from the EU I really don’t think it can be argued that there hasn’t been a significant diminution of sovereignty. It’s interesting you mention the significance of the changeover from sterling but not the changeover to the euro – the loss of any control over monetary policy is something I would certainly see as significant. It hasn’t had that effect psychologically because we’re still in an era where the biggest concern is not having to change currency to go to Torremolinos but it may well become an issue if the economy continues its downward trajectory and people start to twig that this is one tool of recovery not available to us.
we clearly won’t know unless we try and it definitely won’t happen if the left doesn’t attempt it.
Why do we need to pass Lisbon to attempt it?
Wednesday, I’m very dubious about the concept of dependency in this context, not least because our status as a financial beneficiary has changed recently. Also, and again this links back to my view of the EU as assisting interdependency in a way that, while yes, diminishing sovereignty (in pretty specific agreed areas) doesn’t wipe it away. This isn’t the US federal structure, it isn’t the USSR. It’s something very very different. That said I’d be interested for a ref to the 75 – 80% figure. Does that discriminate between regulations and directives and what is the percentage relative to the already existing body of law both pre-1922 and post 22..? I ask because I’ve seen it disputed elsewhere but I don’t have links or access to newspaper archives from this location.
Re the euro, I think that supposed national control of monetary policy, bar at the fringes is a bit chimerical. I think that’s doubly so in this specific economy with a minimal industrial base, diminishing agricultural sector, high dependency upon external investment and a very very strong service sector. The instruments that the euro removed are not utterly insignificant, but nor imo do they provide an absolutely compelling case for retention – quite apart from which there are arguments that within a broad EU context economic stability over a sustained period can be maintained easier than through individual national economies each vying for stability in their localised context.
In answer to your second question as I say I come over the Lisbon line from a mixture of various reasons – one being that to engage with the EU as it is constituted, and is broadly agreed transnationally is starting from a better basis for forging alliances than starting from a position where everything is seen in a negative light. But let me put it slightly differently. The sense I have is that much of the left in both further left and centre left formations absolutely loathes the EU and all its works. I think that psychological barrier is a genuine problem to any serious progress in Europe, not least because while criticism is entirely valid, a sense that the project is in some sense illegitimate runs against the broader grain of thinking across Europe.
Regarding Belgium. I would say the causes are many. I’ll pop in a quote from an old post on my own site:
The divide is geographic, cultural, political, and economic. The northern half of the country speak Flemish, a form of Dutch, while the Southern half speak French. The Flemish part is more populous and by far the richer. Perhaps in line with increasing regionalisation in other European countries (France, Spain, UK) the two halves in Belgium have grown apart over the last 3 decades. A fairly unitary state 30 years ago has evolved gradually into its current Federal form. Divorce in slow motion?
I would say I have to agree here with the point made by Garibaldy when he referred to Hume and Europe of the Regions. First, being in the EU would seem to give regions more confidence that they could survive a breakaway from their currrent inified states. The feeling that the EU is there as a kind of automatic umbrella organisation after breakup must be reassuring. Second, I’m not sure which way the causality runs when limited devolved powers are granted. So, for example, does it mean that there was already a growing national conscience and desire for self government in wales or scotland, or does this sentiment accelerate after devolution. Of course, the accumulated history of a region or nation wiill have a big input into how this force developes once it is unleashed.
Last comment. The poor economic situation in the UK might actually increase the likelihood of a Yes vote in Scotland in the event of a referendum. This is the corollary of the example in NI where a booming economy in the South was an assistance in building greater ties across the border. If the UK economy is going south, people will feel that London is not doing them any good anyway and they’ll be pissed off and more likely to react. (even though the question being asked has long term repurcussions and the downturn, one would hope, is both recent and temporary. But that’s the danger with referenda, you cannot be sure the electorate will not answer a totally different question. And in Lisbon here, they might answer to the question, do you like the current government?)
Ireland’s trade and capital flows are greater with the U.K and the U.S than with the Eurozone. Being unable to adjust its exchange rate or interest rate to those economies with which its links are strongest is hardly rational and may cause problems.
WBS, I can’t find an authoritative cite for the percentage of legislation coming from the EU, but plenty of non-authoritative cites the lowest of which (Ibec) puts it at 50%. I can’t find any cite actually disputing that it’s at least a majority and personally I’d say anything over about 25% would be significant in terms of the sovereignty issue. Obviously secondary legislation should be included in whatever figure is used.
This isn’t the US federal structure
Indeed, in some ways US states are more sovereign. Many of the controls imposed here in the name of “preventing distortion of competition” would be fairly unimaginable over there (to take two recent examples, the debacles of Dublin wifi and banning incandescent lightbulbs). US states also have greater leeway in some respects for differential treatment between their own “citizens” and those of other US states, for example in the area of third level fees.
WRT your final point there are obviously those on the left who are anti-EU as well as those who aren’t, but I simply don’t see how voting Yes to a treaty that makes the bad elements of the EU worse is going to strengthen the position of the latter category. If anything I think it will just neutralise them.
disputing that it’s at least a majority
Or “at least half” anyway
Wednesday, now you’ve really piqued my interest on this issue. I’ve been searching and hope to report back with findings later in the week. It’s a great issue.
Slightly off the point can I ask you re sovereignty, what level of pooling do you think is appropriate and what isn’t?
If you’re looking for a numerical figure, I can’t give one. I think the nature of the “pooling” is more important. I don’t have a great thought-out theory on this, so I’m sure you’ll be able to poke holes in it
but what I’d say roughly is this: as “sovereignty of nations” is really “sovereignty of people” writ large, pooling which results in extension of the rights of the people – that is to say, human rights, including social and economic rights – I don’t generally have a problem with. The further you get from that, and the more towards things like prioritising the free flow of capital, the less acceptable I find it. As I said, that’s just a rough sketch.
Ah, so would it be fair to say its the capital elements that concern you most about the EU? That’s grand. How about political power in areas such as joint foreign policy (I’m thinking of a more coherent approach to regimes that don’t uphold human rights – I’m not talking about intervention in military form)?
Incidentally, I see the SF leaflet that came through my door last night quoted 80%!
To the extent it’s just agreeing not to facilitate other states’ exploiting their own people, no problem. I say that with the caveat that I’m generally suspicious how much self-interest is usually involved in these agreements.
On your second point, scroll down to the penultimate paragraph here
I don’t disagree, although I think that self-interest is involved in every aspects of human/societal relations so it has to be accepted and then we move on.
Hmmm… and yet, still no actual source for these figures. I don’t trust him/them any more than the higher figure.
[...] my slight tilt towards a Yes vote (as noted in the comments to this post by a contributor to the Cedar Lounge Revolution) I’m really much more interested in the [...]
[...] There’s an attitude I’ve heard murmerings about, that if everyone is in agreement on this, there must be something wrong with it. That’s the stupidest argument I’ve heard, and should be immediately discounted. No matter what your political leanings, the Lisbon Treaty makes sense. That is why it has been endorsed by both IBEC (Employer’s Confederation) and ICTU (Congress of Trade Unions). That’s why it has been endorsed by Labour, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Progressive Democrats and the Green politicians. That’s why it has been endorsed by ICAI (Chartered Accountants), ITI (Irish Taxation Institute), IFA (Irish Farmer’s Association), ICMSA (Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association), Alliance for Europe (a civil society pro-Europe grouping) and even the Cedar Lounge Revolution. [...]
[...] some of the causes. Why didn’t it pass? Who is to blame? I’ve already outlined my opinion of the Treaty, and while I’m aware it’s still unlikely to find too much favour around here, it [...]
[...] There’s an attitude I’ve heard murmerings about, that if everyone is in agreement on this, there must be something wrong with it. That’s the stupidest argument I’ve heard, and should be immediately discounted. No matter what your political leanings, the Lisbon Treaty makes sense. That is why it has been endorsed by both IBEC (Employer’s Confederation) and ICTU (Congress of Trade Unions). That’s why it has been endorsed by Labour, Fianna Fáil, Fine Gael, Progressive Democrats and the Green politicians. That’s why it has been endorsed by ICAI (Chartered Accountants), ITI (Irish Taxation Institute), IFA (Irish Farmer’s Association), ICMSA (Irish Creamery Milk Suppliers Association), Alliance for Europe (a civil society pro-Europe grouping) and even the Cedar Lounge Revolution. [...]
Well, some at the CLR… I guess including myself…