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That’s one slow moving ceasefire we’ve got here. August 14, 2008

Posted by WorldbyStorm in International Politics.
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While we’re thinking about language it really is remarkable how it has been distorted in this conflict. On the one hand we have the Georgian government pleading with the world to uphold its democracy and sovereignty. One can agree with the general proposition while being more than a little cautious about the fact that they are largely architects of their own downfall by moving too far too fast and with a complete lack of thought as to the consequences of their actions.

Meanwhile the Russians take their own time about fulfilling the terms of the agreements they made under Sarkozy’s eye. So almost two days after those agreements – and denials that Russian troops were in Gori which is within undisputed Georgian territory – we read that:

A top Russian general said overnight, Gori and the surrounding area will soon be handed over to Georgian forces.

“For another two days Russian troops will stay in the region to carry out procedures of handing over control functions to Georgian law-enforcement bodies after which they will leave,” Major-General Vyacheslav Borisov told Russian news agencies.

“All buildings are in normal shape, the town is supplied with water and electricity,” he added inviting Georgians who fled Gori to return to their homes.

In a way, and going back to some thoughts earlier in the week, it almost seems as if the Russians are undecided now as to what to do next. Covering all the options is the phrase that springs to mind. They’ve successfully extended their authority over South Ossetia and Abkhazia and with military units positioned inside Georgia – and with those military units doing a lot of coat trailing which merely increases the pressures on what remains of Georgian political institutions, note that the Georgian military seems to have near collapsed – they appear to be seeing if a small nudge might see regime change in Tiblisi.

Which makes the comment about ‘handing over control functions to Georgian law-enforcement bodies’ somewhat entertaining in a bleak sort of a way. Just who are those bodies, and how is it intended that they will operate in the current circumstances? Which in a neat fashion lays the grounds for, perhaps, a more permanent presence.

The good General labelled the Georgian government a “virtual project”. I’m always struck by how easily people tend to dismiss other nationalisms while holding firm to their own. The Georgian government may well be – in part a construct – but hardly more so than many of those that exist within those states within Moscow’s orbit. And perhaps less so than others. That said, as the dust clears it is hard to see the present government remaining in power. To lose one autonomous province is misfortune, to lose two… To lose actual Georgian sovereignty, even if only temporarily, a catastrophe.

Still, the approach to Georgian sovereignty was expressed in a most interesting way yesterday:

Sergei Ivanov, Russia’s deputy prime minister, repeatedly refused to recognise Georgian control over its territory. “We recognise the sovereignty of Georgia … but territorial integrity, it’s another matter,” he told the BBC. “South Ossetia and Abkhazia never were part of Georgia as an independent country.”

Well. It’s an argument. Although Russian tanks on undisputed Georgian soil seems to be the antithesis of ‘recognising’ Georgian sovereignty. But really, if the rule book on self-determination and sovereignty is being torn up perhaps it would do us all a service if there were some clearly enunciated principles rather than this opportunist mish-mash of ‘we’ll certainly, definitely, positively leave now… or tomorrow’. Well, now would obviously be better.

And there have been reports that Russia might oversee referendums asking whether South Ossetia and Abhazia would prefer to join the Russian Federation. Hmmm…. Indeed Eoin Ó Murchú argues in a letter in today’s Irish Times that

The Ossetians are not a numerous nation, but they are as entitled to sovereignty as the Georgians or anyone else. And the South Ossetians have made it plain that they do not want to be ruled by Georgia, but prefer to be part of Russia, united with their Northern Ossetians fellow nationals with real autonomy in that federation.

Well. Perhaps in principle. But is that really a wise argument in the context of Chechnya? Or certain other nations already enjoying ‘real’ autonomy within that federation?

For those of us cynical about the death tolls this piece suggests that considerable exaggeration has been the order of the day, on both sides. But the danger of such hyperbolic and self-serving language has been to:

….provoke revenge attacks on Georgian villagers in the republic…

And no doubt a similar process is in train inside Georgia proper against those identified with South Ossetia. So all told a bloody mess.

Meanwhile the US response has been interesting. No hint of any overt military assistance. But as the Guardian reports...

A US C-17 military aircraft carrying supplies and a contingent of military forces to carry out an aid mission arrived in Georgia last night, and a second flight was planned for today. Bush said the US expected Russia to allow humanitarian supplies into Georgia and ensure all lines of communication and transport stayed open.

Which I suppose means that they’re trying to prove that two can play the ‘humanitarian assistance’ card.

And note that:

Analysts said the US was trying to use the flights to demonstrate strength to both Georgia, which has sought a stronger response from Washington, and Russia, while minimising the risk of being drawn into the conflict. Pentagon spokesman Geoff Morrell said the US had been careful to let Russia know about every flight, given the risks of the US and Russian militaries operating in such proximity. “We do not want there to be any potential misunderstanding or miscalculation,” he said.

This must be an excruciating time in the Bush White House, and now more than ever the true meaning of that term is clear. This is in large part a legacy of the toppling of the international order undertaken by that White House, not so much in the specifics, Georgian nationalism was always going to seek to come out from under the Russian shadow, but in the manner in which an emboldened Russia is willing to play fast and loose with the situation.

Incidentally, a sensible proposal (albeit from a specific perspective) from Ken Gude on future US policies in the area which points up the lack of reality of much of the politicking during the Bush era in the region notes the importance of soft power in reshaping the future relationship between Europe, Russia and the US. After all, as he notes, Russia has significant problems of its own:

The energy boom has generated enormous wealth in Russia that has covered over numerous looming crises. Its public institutions are rife with corruption, its infrastructure is crumbling, its health system is a shambles, and it is facing a demographic time bomb of an aging population and a rapidly declining birth-rate. These are all areas in which the US and Europe can help improve the lives of the Russian people. Doing so would require a difficult shift in the orientation of aid programs away from a focus on democracy promotion, but it has the chance of reversing the reputation of the West within Russia and lessening the appetite for confrontation.

And it’s as well to remember that without a serious effort to construct a global security agreement of genuine utility the tensions and conflicts that seem likely to occur over resources will almost inevitably lead to more widespread examples of what we’ve seen this last week.

Comments»

1. Ian - August 14, 2008

I must say I’m impressed with the Georgian police. Having watched them on news reports the last few days, they often seem to be the only form of state authority around in these occupied areas. The military, in contrast, seem to be drunk on the side of the road or not even around.

I don’t think enough attention has been paid to the ethnic national claims of the Ossetians? They don’t seem too enamoured with the Russians either.

As for the Abkhaz, is it tenable to give a nation state status to a territory which doesn’t even have an ethnic majority in its own zone? Before the 1990 war, only 18% of Abkhazia was Abkhaz, and today its still a mere 45%. And still, this is only 45% of 200,000 people! Abkhazian identity seems weak to be honest. I mean, of course there is no perfect standard to judge the merits of a nations claims to self-determination, but I don’t think Abkhazia warrants the humiliation of Georgian sovereignty.

2. skidmarx - August 14, 2008

Part of the reason the Abkhaz may have been down to 18% may have been due to Stalin deporting Abkhaz and replacing them with Georgians. That’s just a speculation.

“And no doubt a similar process is in train inside Georgia proper against those identified with South Ossetia.”

I get the impression that part of the Russian activity btween Gori and South Ossetia has been to let loose Ossetian irregulars to loot Georgian villages. All under the guise of “peace-keeping” and even better “restoring law and order”.

The BBC News were saying “the ceasefire appears fragile”. Hmm. Perhaps “the ceasefire is having an existential crisis”.

The Russian troops who’d started driving round in circles when they left Gori did seem a bit like the Wolfe Tones song
# We’re on the one road, sharing the one load
We’re on the road to God Knows where
It may be the right road, it may be the wrong road
But we’re together now who cares? #

3. Mark P - August 14, 2008

“But really, if the rule book on self-determination and sovereignty is being torn up perhaps it would do us all a service if there were some clearly enunciated principles rather than this opportunist mish-mash of ‘we’ll certainly, definitely, positively leave now… or tomorrow’.”

“Self determination and sovereignty” have only ever existed to the extent that it suits great powers to play word games, or to the extent that they can be enforced with guns. There are no rules or principles beyond that and there never has been. It’s like anything else connected to that meaningless term “international law”, meaningless.

“democracy promotion”

An Orwellian euphemism if ever there was one. It means funding Western stooges, both on the political scene and amongst the plethora of useless NGOs this part of the world seems to be overflowing with.

4. Wednesday - August 14, 2008

They don’t seem too enamoured with the Russians either.

Basis for this comment?

5. WorldbyStorm - August 14, 2008

Yes, that question struck me too Wednesday. I’d have thought that they were very enamoured with the Russians.

Oddly enough talking about police retaining their command structures I was looking up – as one does – Transnistria today. A most interesting couple of wiki pages gave amazing detail on the War of Transnistria and how the police forces were centrally involved. That said, am I wrong in thinking that we’re talking about fairly militarised police forces in these contexts?

Don’t get me wrong Mark P, I’m aware of how contingent such things are… but… it’s fascinating to see the theory bend under the pressure of the real. Incidentally I’m not sure that international law is entirely meaningless, even if only to hold up as an aspirational standard. And work it does on that level, although imperfectly.

6. Ian - August 14, 2008

Wednesday,
Apologies, I meant the Abkhazians aren’t mad on the Russians. It all gets a bit confusing sometimes!

7. WorldbyStorm - August 14, 2008

Well that’s true Ian.