The Cedar Lounge Revolution

Fascinating scenes on Channel 4 News last night and the night before of South Ossetian militia and irregulars at work under the indifferent eye of Russian army units. Roughing up and car-jacking UN monitors, camera crews and those with less muscle, ethnic Georgians.

Most visceral? Perhaps the footage from inside a Turkish TV crew car of them being shot at by irregulars, once more as Russian troops looked on regardless.
So, not so much a peacekeeping operation, or indeed a peace enforcement operation, as a profoundly agressive intrusion into another state well beyond the limits of disputed territory. And somewhat different in character to the words George Galloway used yesterday:

The Russian army were an awesome sight on the march into the two breakaway Caucasus enclaves of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. All that military aid from the US and the Israelis to the Georgian army seems to have been wasted money.

Awesome being clearly in the eye of the beholder. And a term with a multiplicity of meanings – and indeed an unhappy resonance from some years back. But then I suspect it was used entirely deliberately to evoke just that resonance [incidentally, if this report is correct there are some subtle ironies as regards the Georgian army wasting money on arms from Serbia].

That said, nor is it quite as Mikheil Saakashvili characterises it. Or at least not yet.

The historical parallels are stark: Russia’s war on Georgia echoes events in Finland in 1939, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. Perhaps this is why so many eastern European countries, which suffered under Soviet occupation, have voiced their support for us. Russia’s leaders see us as a threat because Georgia is a free country whose people have elected to integrate into the Euro-Atlantic community. But Russia’s rulers do not want their nation or its borders contaminated by democratic ideas.

A little more complex than that Mikheil. Not quite the Prague Spring down Tbilisi way.

And one cannot at all admire George Bush’s chutzpah when he, of all people, said:

This situation can be resolved peacefully. We’ve been in contact with leaders in both Georgia and Russia at all levels of government. Georgia is a sovereign nation and its territorial integrity must be respected.

Or what of Condoleezza Rice:

The United States calls for an immediate ceasefire to the armed conflict in Georgia’s region of South Ossetia. We call on Russia to cease attacks on Georgia by aircraft and missiles, respect Georgia’s territorial integrity, and withdraw its ground combat forces from Georgian soil.

Or hows about John McCain – staunch ally of Bush in Iraq (although not so much of Bush in the White House).

In recent days Moscow has sent its tanks and troops across the internationally recognized border into the Georgian region of South Ossetia. Statements by Moscow that it was merely aiding the Ossetians are belied by reports of Russian troops in the region of Abkhazia, repeated Russian bombing raids across Georgia, and reports of a de facto Russian naval blockade of the Georgian coast. Whatever tensions and hostilities might have existed between Georgians and Ossetians, they in no way justify Moscow’s path of violent aggression. Russian actions, in clear violation of international law, have no place in 21st century Europe.

Neat that, the ’21st century Europe’ formulation.

Anyhow. Quite a mess, and far far from the assurances given earlier in the week by Medvedev.

And that leads me to Seamus Milne’s entertaining piece in the Guardian yesterday, which while right on many aspects of the conflict goes a bit off the rails when he argues that:

If so, it has spectacularly backfired, at savage human cost. And despite Bush’s attempts to talk tough yesterday, the war has also exposed the limits of US power in the region. As long as Georgia proper’s independence is respected – best protected by opting for neutrality – that should be no bad thing. Unipolar domination of the world has squeezed the space for genuine self-determination and the return of some counterweight has to be welcome.

Is Russia seriously a ‘counterweight’ and a force for upholding ‘genuine self-determination’? As I noted earlier in the week, for some considerable length of time this decade that argument could be made. Or rather it wasn’t a counterweight as much as a state which articulated a cautious and sensible approach to international relations. But today? To me this seems to be nothing so much as Russia having regained a certain amount of power deciding that it need not work within the structures of the “little” nations. A pity.

And to follow on from my thoughts yesterday about how some on the left seem to simply dismiss, or not understand, nationalism or indeed sovereignty, I have to wonder at an analysis which argues that somehow Georgia can opt for ‘neutrality’. Neutrality against or for whom, as the joke goes. One can deplore entirely, as I do, the adventurism of the Georgian incursions into South Ossetia, without for a second dismissing the unease of Georgia as a state and nation at its proximity to its former imperial power. The two issues are – and should be – quite distinct. Moreover sovereignty, genuine sovereignty, is about allowing people and nations to make their own decisions – some of which are hard to stomach, but it is for the Georgian people to decide their course of action within the constraints of international law. It’s hard to envisage Milne writing a similar article arguing that Cuba should pursue a course of ‘neutrality’ as regards the US. It’s a nonsensical proposition, not least due to the shared history of the two countries. It may develop, in fact probably will develop, into a more amicable relationship as time progresses. But at the moment it is one of mutual suspicion – and worth noting rumbles from Russia that it may station strategic bombers in Cuba. Is it sensible? Probably not. Nor does it materially affect the balance of military power. But it remains entirely legitimate.

Look, I’m as prey to the next former WP member to a residual to ost-nostalgia, but I’m pretty sure I can see a distinction between the USSR, which even at the time I was never entirely fond of, and the Russian Federation. And it’s hard not to continue to think that this nonsense about unipolarity is overdone (Jesus, Martin Jacques has been banging on about the coming Peoples Republic of China dominated world for as long as I can remember on the very same pages that Milne edits – and speaking of Jacques, for a while I couldn’t understand his trajectory and then I realised that he was taking a branch line, albeit on a grander scale, from other Marxism Today types who wound up supporting formerly Marxist/socialist turned hyper capitalist endeavours in New Labour. Just for him it’s the real hyper-capitalism of the PRC). We’ve lived in a multi-polar world for as long as I’ve been alive and the grand narrative (there, that term again) of the Cold War merely pushed powers onside into fairly arbitrary categories. But under the radar some remarkable stuff happened. Not for nothing do I get a certain visceral shock when I see – for example – the residual power of the French in Africa and in their former colonies including those in the Caribbean. It’s not a huge country France but it wields more hard power and authority on the global stage, arguably, than the UK. And it has retained a considerable amount of that residual power throughout an historical period when one might have expected it to lose it. And as with France, so with India, Brazil, China, South Africa and so on and so forth.

But odd statements are proliferating. For example, what of yeserday’s Guardian editorial which argues that:

But some conclusions can be drawn. The first is that Georgia has lost South Ossetia and Abkhazia for good. The bloodshed this week is a repeat performance of that unleashed by the Georgian nationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia when he abolished South Ossetia’s autonomous status in 1990. Two wars in one generation is more than enough for local memories. The German chancellor, Angela Merkel, may insist that the territorial integrity of Georgia should be the basis of any eventual settlement. But the conflict has already been settled – on the ground. A substantial Russian military force will stay on the borders of both contested provinces, whether they hold referendums on independence or not.

Cold comfort there too for the Palestinians I’d have thought. Does the Guardian likewise feel that Gaza and the West Bank have been settled because substantial Israeli military forces are likely to ’stay’ within their borders? Because the argument on show in that paragraph slips perilously – and almost explicitly – close to a ‘facts on the ground’ analysis. Moreover it is interesting how it ignores in the phrase ‘a repeat performance unleashed by Zviad Gamsakhurdia when he abolished South Ossetia’s autonomous status’ a simple fact that, as reported at the time (in Time magazine as one source):

Last September, as the rest of Georgia was moving toward independence, the South Ossetian regional council declared the area to be a “Soviet Democratic Republic” loyal to Moscow. The parliament in Tbilisi responded by dissolving the autonomous region altogether. Conflicts between the Georgian police and local separatists have resulted in at least 12 deaths.

Now one may take a position on any side as regards the status of South Ossetia and my view, for what its worth is that it should be fully autonomous with links both North and south, but what is described is clearly somewhat different to a process of abrupt removal of South Ossetian autonomy in the early 1990s (which is not to ignore activities of the Georgian SSR prior to that which seemed to attempt to enforce Georgian identity across the state).

And whatever about South Ossetia it seems to me that Abkhazia is a somewhat different situation again, one could make a strong argument that Upper Abkhazia should remain under Georgian control.

And a further thought, how precisely does this counterweight operate? If there is no essential ideological distinction between Moscow and Washington to whose benefit is this? If the Cold War saw countries fall into line behind one or other of the great powers how does that open up a space for a serious non-alignment? I don’t think it does. If the Cold War were anything to go by it actually made the prospect of a serious non-aligned or neutral stance more difficult.

So what are we left with? Nothing good. And perhaps a lot worse.

The Russians have stated that:

“By deploying [the Pentagon missile shield], Poland is exposing itself to a strike – 100%,” warned Colonel General Anatoly Nogovitsyn. He added that Russia’s security doctrine allowed it to use nuclear weapons against an active ally of a nuclear power such as America.

It’s an empty threat, rhetorical in all senses – although it would be interesting to parse out ‘active’ ally. Yet it’s also a staggering threat. But these are the times we live in.

And not the least worrying image on Channel 4 News was a Russian soldier in Georgian military uniform. This has a fair way to go yet.

Meanwhile I hope to address in the next day or two some of the issues as regards the Kosovo/South Ossetia Serbia/Georgia issue that seems to crop up again and again with emphasis on the view from Belgrade. That’s a whole different issue again.

Incidentally, for two sensible takes on the actual power politics of the region read here…. and here.