The Cedar Lounge Revolution

The thought struck me yesterday as I read Phil’s very sensible comment on this post [see #47], that while the scenes from the Georgia may well be a source of gloom for most of us that gloom must be heightened in Belgrade and almost entirely absent in large swathes of Kosovo. Because if nothing else these events underpin the secession of Kosovo from Serbia.

The inherent logic of the Russian actions, and not merely the military ones, but the talk about referendums to cement South Ossetia and other disputed regions into the Russian Federation, is such that it means that the inglorious path forged by the US and the EU in Serbia is being taken in South Ossetia. Next stop for the latter? The Russian Federation, if not de jure then de facto. One might argue that at the very least it is happening with unreasonable speed. One might argue that it is – in contrast to Kosovo – happening in the absence of discussions, however cosmetic, between the parties.

So, what is the response from Belgrade. Well, wiki has a quote from Oliver Ivanović, State Secretary of the Ministry for Kosovo and Metohija

“The question of Kosovo was didactic and inspirational for South Ossetia, so that they wanted to further strain the relations and define their position, which is understandable. Georgia has tried to solve the issue by using violence just as Serbia tried to do it in 1999. Again as in the case of Kosovo, the politics of double standards will come out in the United Nations. Countries that have recognized the independence of Kosovo are now looking for an argument that Kosovo is a “special case”, which is a complete nonsense. When one goes into the violation of the international law and disregard of the sovereignty of states, as it was done in the case of Kosovo, they can expect the possibility that such a recipe will be applied in all other situations”.[57]

I guess it’s not the greatest translation, although whoever did has better Serbian than me (I have none at all). But it’s a fair point. And I’m particularly impressed by how Ivanović doesn’t shy away – as some have – from pointing out the central problematic aspect of this whole issue, the use of violence to ’solve’ the issue, in both instances. I’ve mentioned before how Belgrade took a much more constructive approach in the run up to Kosovo seceding, this approach is on show here as well.

Ivanović is correct to point to the rather slipshod arguments made around Kosovan exceptionalism. It is far from it – if anything. Kosovo was entirely similar to many many conflicts around the globe.

Following on from this there is an interesting report at B92 [the Serbian news site - once part of the anti-Milosevic opposition, now something of a tamed beast of the current government, but still an interesting read...]. And interestingly in this instance they relay a story critical of the current government…

Political analyst Obrad Kesić has criticized the government for staying silent over the South Ossetia conflict.

In an article for Belgrade daily Politika, Kesić writes that government officials and the foreign minister had “both moral and political reasons to make themselves heard” as soon as the conflict broke out.

“The silence of Serbian officials served as a sign of silent support for Russia’s punishment of Georgia,” he says.

“In principle, a Serbian statement might have irritated Moscow, but would not have provoked condemnation, except unless Russia had been insincere when affirming Georgia’s territorial integrity and sovereignty,”

I think he’s right. And particularly so when he continues:

“maybe [the government was] too inexperienced to realize that they had an opportunity to prove that their argument was right, and that recognition of Kosovo as an independent state would destabilize other countries and regions where separatists, encouraged by the decision [to recognize Kosovo], would resolutely pursue their ambitions for independence.”

“They [Serbian officials] also missed the opportunity to point out the inaccuracy of statements by the U.S. and EU that Kosovo was a sui generis case. Finally, they missed the chance to reaffirm their main argument that when international law and the UN Charter are bypassed, the law of the jungle wins,” Kesić explains.

And even more so with:

The analyst adds that Serbia would only have increased its chances of successful lobbying for support of its initiative in the UN General Assembly had it exposed the “hypocrisy of Bush’s statements on the need to preserve Georgia’s sovereignty, in the light of his policy towards Kosovo.”

“I am under the impression that this is yet another case of [Serbia’s] excessive inordinate caution when it comes to upsetting anyone in the EU and risking an extension of the list of conditions Serbia has to meet to enter the Union,” Kesić writes.

Which is interesting in itself, isn’t it?

In his opinion, if Serbia is not consistent in its defense of international law, “how can anyone believe that this government is dedicated and determined in its fight for Kosovo?”

And here’s the thing, that initiative at the UN is something that seems to have largely slipped under the radar of the European media. Because the Serb government resolved to ask the General Assembly to look for an advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice on the legality of Kosovan independence.

Foreign Minister Vuk Jeremić said that:

The initiative’s short term aim would be to prevent countries that have not yet recognized Kosovo from doing so during the ICJ’s period of deliberation on the motion, and to prevent Kosovo from being accepted into any international organizations, he explained.

If the court rules that the declaration of Kosovo’s independence was not carried out in accordance with international law, Jeremić hopes that it will create an environment for new negotiations, which is the initiative’s long term objective.

Commenting on events in Georgia, the minister said since the very outset of the Kosovo crisis, Serbia had stressed that Kosovo’s unilateral declaration of independence represented an ethnically motivated attempt to secede from Serbia that would set a dangerous precedent for the solution of problems all over the world.

“The conflict in the Caucusus has shown the dangers of the militaristic approach to problem solving,” Jeremić said, adding that “Serbia’s approach will be different, based on legal grounds and peaceful, which means seeking the opinion of the ICJ.”

The General Assembly will consider the request this Autumn. Stand or fall the broad route Serbia is taking is one of working within current international law. It’s a sensible course and one that may well cause significant problems for the US (and to a lesser extent the EU) further down the line. Still, that said it will also be problematic for Russia as well. Because despite their protestations their actions seem to be belying the notion that Kosovo is not exception whatever the rhetoric. The Russian Ambassador to Serbia was forced to walk a very tricky line when he noted that:

“We are very pleased that you understand this situation well, that you did not fall for a propaganda scam, that is attempting to present an aggression on the part of the Georgian army against its own citizens as a conflict between Georgia and Russia.”

“Russians will never go to war against Georgians, just as Russians will never go to war against Serbs. Thank you for understanding the whole situation, and for expressing your sympathies over this sad situation in your letters and verbal contacts with the Russian embassy. Thank you very much,” Konuzin said.

Russia believes there are no similarities between the cases of Kosovo and South Ossetia, and that Moscow had the right to intervene in Georgia.

“In the past ten years Georgia has on several occasions gone to war with a people that lives in the territory of that republic. And we cannot ignore that fact. Under the present conditions we see a genocide practically taking place against an ethnic minority,” Konuzin said.

Sure. Still, it’s all very well saying there is no similarity between the two situations, but since the import of his words, as distinct from the flourishes about gratitude and sympathy, is cut from the same cloth as the US when talking about in Kosovo this can hardly be of much comfort to Serbia.

Of course, if Kosovo is not sui generis and typical of conflicts around the globe, how much more so in relation to conflicts around Russia. Which leads to another thought. Is the next period of time going to see the Russians ‘define their position’ in relation to such spots? Any of us can list off the contested territories, and some of these are a lot more dangerous in global terms than Georgia. For example, what of Transnistria?

And what of future partitions of states with large pro or ethnic Russian populations? The Ukraine is an obvious example. And not for nothing are they offering elements of their own defensive system to the West over the weekend (again, as mentioned previously, in this instance bipolarity/multipolarity may simply see people deciding to take sides for better or for worse). They are acutely aware of their pivotal position and the rhetoric, and substance, out of Moscow may simply drive them towards the West. More unintended consequence. More worrying, although less likely, are the Baltic Republics. That said this is merely musing. Most probable is a ‘clarification’ as regards states. Softish power will be the order of the day. And that can’t be good for Russia, not least because it generates a very specific dynamic within that state which seeks appropriation and consolidation rather than cooperation. Nor is it good for the region with consequent instability or further afield with yet another example of power politics.

None of this is of any comfort whatsoever for Ivanović and the Serbian government. They might have cause to wonder where their former allies in the Kremlin have gone. Indeed Serbians might wonder whether it was just rhetoric all along. For note that even the US can drum up a couple of military aircraft to supply Tbilisi.

I wonder did Russia make a calculation early this year that all was lost in Kosovo. Indeed one wonders how this played out in the politics of government formation in Belgrade some months back. Perhaps Moscow thought that giving the nod to the Socialist Party to enter government, even indirectly, was as good a way of retaining some residual influence in Serbia – and probably a better bet than the more rhetorically pro-Russian parties. Or am I misreading this and in reality – on some level – this move by the Russians is indicative of their abandoning a Serbia which voted, marginally it must be admitted, for the European option.

But for Serbia and Kosovo there is no going back now. I’m a strong proponent of Serbian (and indeed all the Balkan states) accession to the EU, I think that should be in tandem with Kosovo in order that some sort of agreement could be arranged to safeguard those Serbian populations within Kosovo and to establish links between Serbia and those populations within an EU context. After the last couple of weeks and the object demonstration in how instability flourishes in situations where there is a lack of clarity, or indeed proper security guarantees, one might say the sooner the better.