A few thoughts on these events in the North… March 10, 2009
Posted by WorldbyStorm in Northern Ireland, The North.trackback
In a way there is little more to be added to Garibaldy’s points on the murder itself. A crushing blow to a family. But beyond, unfortunately as ever, there lies a political context.
The idea has been raised that the flaws in the Good Friday Agreement have been in some sense demonstrated by attacks by RIRA and CIRA. If that’s the standard we’re setting then it is far too low. I have no problem arguing that the GFA is problematic, but I’d also argue that it’s the least problematic of all possible solutions actually, as distinct from hypothetically, on offer. Therefore I’d expect, if not in fact demand, any critique to at least address actually realisable and not hypothetical alternatives.
In any case there is no great mystery to any of this. A United Ireland is not feasible given the current disposition – not of the British, but of Unionism. I think an evolutionary process on both parts of the island can – and I’m talking decades here – bring the two parts together into a some form of partnership deepening into eventual unity. Now the logic of that suggests that the Unionists have to be the main focus of activity with Republicans and Nationalists engaging with them constructively.
All that said I can’t for the life of me see how shooting two British soldiers or a PSNI constable is somehow representative of an process that will lead to any greater engagement with unionism. One of the most remarkable aspects of dissident Republicanism has been, at least in its public utterances, a complete blindness (or deliberate aversion) to thinking about how Unionism can be accommodated. CIRA and RIRA and their vestigial political elements seem to be essentially expecting some deus ex machina to do something, anything, to resolve the situation in their favour. In a way that deus ex machina is expected, paradoxically to be the United Kingdom who are meant to assume their apparently historic role in persuading Unionists to somehow not be Unionists. That ain’t going to happen either. But that is the basic logic of the programme they have embarked upon, a logic which can be seen to be intrinsically flawed on many different levels.
Add to that the central random aspect of this violence belies its political and strategic incoherence and poverty. Because even if violence is ramped up, and let’s not overstate how easy it is to attack successfully police and army, or otherwise it would be a daily occurrence, a further paradox is that it will – as it largely did during the 1980s – lose both its shocking immediacy and news value and its capacity to further political change. One of the crucial mistakes of dissident Republicanism is to ignore the realities of the most recent phase of the conflict, one where despite considerable societal mobilisation PIRA was unable to move beyond a bleak stalemate. That formations with a fraction of the power, capability and broad societal support of PIRA at its height should think that somehow their much lower level attacks can reap the whirlwind they seek is bizarre. Even as exemplary and gestural violence this is so limited. And it’s not as if – unlike the 1969 to 1972 period – the state(s) is (are) unaware of this. The one message coming across loud and clear is that the army will not return to the streets.
In the context of how difficult it has been to bring Unionism to accept the GFA (and lets be clear a minority of Unionism doesn’t accept it) it seems to me simply pointless to pretend that we can just wipe the Agreement away. That ain’t going to work either, any alternative will have to be an evolutionary development from the GFA. And all the talk of being ‘anti-GFA’ is frankly also pointless unless those who argue that can clearly map out paths from it to other destinations.
It’s not that one can’t be anti-GFA, that’s indeed an entirely tenable position politically. But for it to have any substance it necessitates being able to explain how we can move from a process that is now heavily invested in by not merely the governments, but more clearly from the response of the last day or so, the populations of North and South.
And here is the truly problematical aspect of this for dissident Republicanism. The Good Friday Agreement may well be built on the rather shaky foundations of two separate votes in the two parts of the island, but those votes now carry a political legitimacy, certainly the greatest degree of such legitimacy in our lifetimes, as the expression of the Irish people. Those votes have been further legitimised by elections subsequent to the GFA. Martin McGuinness used the term ‘traitors to the island of Ireland’ to describe those who carried out those acts (and Hugh Orde appeared momentarily nonplussed). It’s an almost Jesuitical formulation in its ability to incorporate many different meanings, but it is hard not to share at least some sense with him that the contexts generated by the GFA, imperfect and all, give some substance to the idea that there is now extant a consensus on this island, a consensus that exists because eventually the Irish people on the island were asked for their affirmation of the agreement, that is inherently different to that which existed prior to the GFA.
“Add to that the central random aspect of this violence belies its political and strategic incoherence and poverty. Because even if violence is ramped up, and let’s not overstate how easy it is to attack successfully police and army, or otherwise it would be a daily occurrence, a further paradox is that it will…lose both its shocking immediacy and news value and its capacity to further political change.”
I’m still puzzled as to why they would carry out such attacks, TBH.
To analyse the issue coldly for a minute, it’s not like such groups
have the military clout to achieve anything more than a ramping up
of British security. Prehaps they’re hoping to provoke a violent
Loyalist backlash or something?
I think WBS’s post is both interesting and thoughtful. However, I wonder whether he pushes a little too hard when he argues that any critique of the GFA has to “address actually realisable and not hypothetical alternatives.” I understand his point but it seems to me that Mick Hall was correct in a response to an earlier post where he pointed out that there was no oppositional current within the GFA. It may be that a “realisable” alternative can only emerge from a struggle over the contours of the GFA.
None of that is a justification, of course, of the recent actions of the CIRA/RIRA. As WBS argues, politically, there is just nothing going on there. Such actions are a waste.
Recent events may be part of the evolutionary process of republicanism leaving the stage. Early on, Adams and company sold the agreement to their supporters as “transitional” and “stepping stone” measures to unity. Later on, Adams argued that the full implementation of the GFA, for republicans, represented the “full and final closure of the conflict.”
The GFA is the only game in town — it will not go away by killing a cop and it will only change when an oppositional current develops within it.
Bakunin, I agree with the point you’re making entirely and I should have been more clear. I think there is a clear problematic aspect of the GFA in that it doesn’t encompass that oppositional current while it tries to encompass everything else. That’s a serious flaw and I think you’re right it has to be within it – if only simply because it seems, and I could be very wrong on this but so far I think its demonstrable by the support given to pro-GFA parties as against those anti-GFA in subsequent elections, it has been given legitimacy by the population.
I find what you say about the transitional versus the final closure interesting. It could be argued that the conflict on the armed struggle level is finally closed by the GFA but that it in itself remains transitional. That’s certainly my viewpoint. And again, I’m not trying to attack those who take an anti-GFA position (short of the pointlessness of the CIRA/RIRA rejectionist positions) but instead suggest that its necessary to deal with the world as it is and move on from there.
Starkadder, as Garibaldy said, its often overstated the support for rejectionism say during the WoI, most folded their tents and then attempted to change from the inside. But, there was a core which accorded far too great a weight to militarism almost for its own sake rather than political progress. If you read any of the material from the two organisations or their proxies who were active at the weekend it is remarkable how much rests on the past in one case and on very very nebulous concepts of sovereignty in the other. In both cases, as I’ve noted above, the reality of Unionism, or how to address it, is simply ignored except for bromides about how we’ll all live happily ever after. Not a message I’d be keen to deliver to the Shankill and hope for a positive reception.
The ‘traitors’ remark is rather striking. But for McGuinness, I don’t think there’s much difference between (a) “the island of Ireland”, (b) the republican movement as a whole and (c) PSF – I mean, he probably thinks (b) is the best representative of (a), and he’ll certainly think that (c) is the best representative of (b). I remember Adams’s pitch to the British left used to be “leave us to it” – and it wasn’t quite clear whether “us” meant “the Irish people” or SF, for similar reasons.
Strong words, though, and from someone with a certain amount of authority in this area – I imagine he’s got RIRA/CIRA volunteers watching their backs and checking under their cars. Although SF is in a weird position on this one, as with the problem of ASB and ‘hoods’: they got where they are now partly by standing down the IRA, but partly by having had the IRA behind them in the past. A few paramilitary punishment beatings on the estates would probably do wonders for SF’s popular support; dealing with *IRA in Craigavon wouldn’t be unpopular either. But neither of those things is likely to happen, because any rise in armed violence which could be pinned on PIRA would pull the rug from under SF. And you’ve got to wonder what effect keeping the IRA stood down will have on SF – how much of their support derives from being the guys who used to know the guys who used to run the IRA, and how long can they go on trading on that?
It’s a huge paradox for SF. They can’t move but in a way they can’t not move. Back in the Workers’ Party days there was a similar pressure on us to deploy our supposed fearsome resources, particularly against drug dealers, and often mention was made of our supposed links to greater muscle. There was no end of disappointment when that proved to be not forthcoming. I think there is something in what you say about the SF approach, as was, and in a sense as is. But I’m continually surprised at how long people do trade on such matters. It operates in a curious way, the further back something is sometimes the greater the legitimacy.
There’s no chance of the Provos striking at the dissidents. The dissidents can carry out many killings and not collapse the institutions; one shooting or bombing (note I don’t say beating) by the Provos, and they are gone overnight. The Provo leadership know this themselves, as do the overwhelming majority of their members.The dissidents know it too. The police is where it is at once and for all.
That’s true as well but it still leaves SF in a bind. Of course, much depends on how widespread any hostile sentiment is to them and their positions and for all the bluster and putting to one side a very genuine critique that exists it seems to me to be less rather than more. What do you think?
I’m not sure what you mean. I think you mean less hostility rather than more to the Provos. Certainly McGuinness’ statement seems to have done a power of good for their image within unionism. He couldn’t really have been any stronger, though of course there remain those who yap regardless. I think most people outside unionism have been impressed too. There can be no doubting their commitment to making the institutions work, and accpeting the consequences of that. Not sure if that’s what you were asking though. By the by, I don’t think that they are in as much of a bind as people think. They knew this day could come, and I’m sure had thought about it.
one shooting or bombing (note I don’t say beating) by the Provos, and they are gone overnight
Noted – but I hope we’re not going back to PPBs. There was a nasty self-propelling dynamic to the confrontation between the Provos and the hoods. They (the latter) knew what the balance of forces was, they knew one beating was going to be followed by another, but they couldn’t back down without massive loss of face – so they didn’t back down. The ceasefire made matters worse, ironically enough – “two in the knees” is a lot cleaner and more treatable than the equivalent administered with baseball bats.
Sorry, I should have made myself clearer. I don’t believe the Provos are interested in punishment beatings either. I just meant that the Paul Quinn murder hadn’t collapsed the Executive, and potentially if something like that happened again, it wouldn’t be the same as a shooting or bombing.
I simply do not believe that the scenario created by the GFA is the only one in town. The recent attacks have shown that this is far from a normal or acceptable set of circumstances. Retarded political situation create retarded political action such as the recent killings.
If we are to analyse this coldly without moralising or banal condemnation politicking, we need to address the reasons why something like this can happen.
A lot of republicans on this island do not see the GFA as a mechanism of National Self Determination. If anything , it was a mechanism that gave the Unionists and the british government vetoes over the constitutional future of the whole island. Granted the GFA was voted for by the majority in the north (the southern referendum was a vote for by proxy whilst simultaneously gifting the northern unionists with an extra bulwark against unification) , but lets be honest it was voted for more as an expression of war fatigue rather than the nuts and bolts of its contents, which incidentally were vague enough to interpret as equally republican and unionist in their intentions.
That could be argued as necessary at the time, but it was dangerously short sighted a la Versaille. A lot of republicans recognised this at the beginning but were maligned and suffered character assasination from their erstwhile comrades within PSF.
It was only as a matter of time before this scenario came to pass. i remember Brendan Hughes addressing a public meeting in Derry via telephone finishing his speech with a broadside at the PSF leadership for taking the republican struggle into a unionist cul de sac. He said , “God forgive for passing this bloody struggle on to a future generation, for i cannot”.
He recognised that in the absence of a clear path to National Self Determination, some would raise arms again.
A political response is required. This Peace Process has simply become an ends in itself. The peace Process is over. We have peace but we also have a retarded political reality wherein a minority on the island hold a veto over the majority.
If the last phase of conflict taught us anything, its that a security response to a political problem can at most contain armed insurgency in a limited fashion.
If a mechanism for periodical all ireland constitutional referenda was created then real debate vis a vis the pros vs the cons of unification could take place in a democratic fashion with republican and Unionists/ left and right able to state their case and then vote on it.
why is this not a viable scenario? What could be more democratic?
The point isn’t why it was voted for… we can’t second guess electorates. The fact is it was voted for. Now, your proposition about regular referenda sounds great, and indeed hugely democratic, but what do you think the result would be in the South if – for example – there was a loyalist bombing campaign coming up to a UI vote? I’ll bet there’d be a NO vote, and in every subsequent referendum. Which is precisely why I’d bet this process will take decades so that Unionism and Loyalism can be brought into a more complex and more engaged process that will see overlapping sovereignty, etc.
How about giving Liverpool and the Wirral, to the Irish and the brits keeping Northern Ireland as a swap. Then in liverpool the Irish get a great soccer team + Everton, where most of them scousers are Irish anyway. Plus you get Wayne Rooney and Gerrard for your soccer side, which to be honestis worth more than northner ireland.
I fully expect a nobel peace prize soon. Tell Gerry Adams and Iain Paisley about my new idea.
Granted the GFA was voted for by the majority in the north (the southern referendum was a vote for by proxy
Oh dear, not this old chestnut again. Did any of the anti-GFA groups in the south actually read the referendum they (presumably) voted against?
That’s a fair point which I missed reading that particular comment.
Tomas has raised some very important points and they are well worth pondering. Wednesday, may be correct about the wording, but most people when voting in their respective ballots, north and south, voted in favor because they were war weary and heart sick of the bloody carnage. When they cast their votes, the fine detail of the wording was not the most important thing on their minds.
What is so wrong about a periodic referendum, after all the border is still the most contentious issue Ireland faces, not least because its very presence can so easily make people act violently. Surly a referendum would bring democratic political activity to the fore and ease the pressures periodically.
It may also rejuvenate politics on the island, especially in the North, for with the two communities not far off population parity, it may nudge the politicos to start delivery to their respective electorates.
In a way I don’t disagree Mick with a periodic referendum on the GFA, indeed there’s a strong case to be made that such a referendum would further underpin the institutions by giving them even greater democratic legitimacy.
I’m not so sure that it was war weariness which led to the Yes vote. Two aspects of the vote seem to me to be crucial. Firstly that Nationalism/Republicanism voted overwhelmingly in favour whereas Unionism only (as far as can be judged) voted marginally in favour. On the Unionist side, at least, that wouldn’t suggest a war weariness, on the Nationalist/Republican side the context of the ceasefires (intermittent but extant) seems to me to have taken the hard edge away from the conflict. Granted war weariness played a part, but perhaps more importantly the recognition that armed struggle could only go so far. And the fine detail point, while not entirely wrong, seems to me to be sometimes overblown. If the charge is that the GFA is Sunningdale MkII then it’s hard to believe people didn’t get the parameters of the agreement. If the charge is that it was something completely different then it seems unlikely that there wasn’t at least some grasp of the issues. Beyond that there is the core issue that in the South, lamentably, the North is not a significant issue politically in a general way. If 30 years of conflict didn’t change that (indeed, arguably made it worse) then I can’t think of anything that will bring it front and centre.
When they cast their votes, the fine detail of the wording was not the most important thing on their minds.
Is it ever in a referendum? Most of those who voted against Lisbon (or for Lisbon for that matter) weren’t concerned with the fine detail of the wording either. Don’t get me wrong, there are plenty of legitimate criticisms of the GFA, but the argument that the Irish people didn’t really endorse it in 1998 isn’t one of them.
Personally, I don’t see the point of a referendum before there is clearly a chance that it might be won, but if people wanted them regularly I wouldn’t object. That said, what difference would they make to the dissident argument? None that I can see, and certainly not while two are held in two different states. Even if by some miracle there was a single referendum for the whole island (say the question was unity by consent), then we would just hear them say that no generation can give away the rights of the nation. So they would continue on regardless with the same level of support as they have now. I don’t think any of their supporters is in any doubt that they do not represent the Irish people but only themselves.
From my experience, people in the north knew what they were voting for: power-sharing, prisoners out, reform of the police. Partly tiredness of the violence, but more than that.
And Mick says that the border produces violence, and so is the most important issue. But there are also sectarian killings and sectarian violence, even if often not with guns.
WBS
But surely recognizing that “armed struggle could only go so far” was an expression of war weariness. On this point, there is little doubt that Gerry Adams deserves enormous credit for publicly recognizing this fact, but then I suppose one can carry only so many coffins of friends and comrades before the penny drops. Nevertheless credit where credit is due, but why oh why does he feel the need to rap it all up in a union jack bow.
Those who claim that McGuinness’s astonishing behavior earlier in the week, when he called republicans traitors, was on a par with Dev’s about face in WW2, is absolute nonsense. For Dev never recognized Britain’s right to occupy Irish soil. Indeed the reason he turned on republicans in WW2 was because he feared the British, with US acquiescence would re-occupy the 26. We can argue about his behavior but even his critics concede he was an honorable man, could the same be said about MM.
Have you noticed how the British press have highlighted MM’s church going, love of country pursuits, and abstinence from alcohol, just the man to run an outpost of empire.
To compare a minnow like McGuinness with Dev, for all his faults, is to insult the intelligence of the reader.
Ah, I see your point, that it was only war weariness that would allow people to see the reality of the situation. I completely agree. I thought you meant that war weariness led to a sort of passive acceptance.
Interesting that the RUC have arrested leading members of Eirigi in Lurgan and Derry. Is this an attack on Eirigi or are we seeing a military wing evolve.? Considering how the leadership of Eirigi is still close to leading Shinners,especially in Belfast, I would be surprised if they were to move over to physical force stuff. Perhaps its fjust a case of round up the usual suspects.
That’s very weird I agree. There was a sort of subtext that some of those picked up had left Éirígí…
When Colin Duffy’s name was mentioned it brought to mind the 70s campaign in London to free George Davis. George had been a well known east London criminal who the police fitted up for an armed robbery.
His wife Rose, along with friends mounted a ferocious campaign to overturn the conviction and he was eventually released. Sadly George returned to his trade and was later arrested as he was about to rob a bank.
My point is only the most stupid blagger would have gone on a job with George as he was hated by the police with a venom, thus they would in all probability have dogged his every footstep.
Colin Duffy is in a similar position; and I find it hard to believe any rational republican would send him out, or out with him on a job. His arrest and the others seem nothing more than a fishing expedition and an attempt to link all ‘dissidents’ with armed struggle.
Just reading the Irish News and it seems that Eirigi have ditched Colin Duffy and Declan McGlinchey. Both were described as former members. All this after Eirigi only recently was parading both of them around as prize catches. Looks like the Eirigi strings were truly pulled in by Belfast.
My God… throwing their grandmothers under the bus as Americans put it… I’m a bit surprised to be honest Eamonn, although fair enough in so far as I didn’t think éirígí were likely to be involved (and I’m no great fan of their approach). What is going on?
It seems that Duffy left before these events. I don’t know abou Declan McGlinchey, but it seems equally likely that they dumped éirígí as vice versa.
Maybe Bobby Storey decided enough was enough and pulled in the reins.
Eamonn,
Are you suggesting éirígí was a Provo front all along, or that the Provos threatened them? I take it it is the first you mean. I don’t think that people coming and going from a new political organisation is that surprising, especially when its fundamental positions have not yet been fully settled. I don’t think a conspiracy theory is necessary to explain these events.
Eamonn,
If you are just having a bit of fun, you need to say so, if not and you have evidence as to what you have alluded to, equally so. For if you do not, it will be you people draw conclusions about, not éirígí.
I am just mentioning the close relationship between Big Bobby and Brian. Maybe Bobby just gave Brian some advice. Its always nice to see a friendly split between republican groups, after all, weren’t all previous splits friendly!! More importantly, Eirigi are on the go about two years now and their main activity is to protest outside the British Embassy and their main policies are……? …….eh…….no royal visit?
Eirigi are on the go about two years now
Three, actually.