Posted by Tomboktu in Austerity, Human Rights, Social Policy.
This is the second of two posts on the topic of austerity and human rights. Yesterday I reported on a recent set of five cases taken against Greece. Today, I examine the possibility of applying EU law to challenge the way in which austerity is imposed by the troika.
Yesterday’s post was a report, with some analysis and views, on five cases that have been successful. Today’s is different: it is entirely speculative, but it might prompt action.
Two paragraphs in the Greek pension decisions contain important points. One reports the Greek government saying that it had to restrict the pensioners’ rights because of its obligations to the EU instituions and the IMF for the loans it was getting. The second quotes the ILO (referred to as the “High Level Mission” in the following paragraph):
[...] the Government indicated that data from ELSTAT showed that approximately 20 per cent of the population was facing the risk of poverty but that it did not have an opportunity, in meetings with the Troika, to discuss the impact of the social security reforms on the spread of poverty, particularly for persons of small means and the social security benefits to withstand any such trend. It also did not have the opportunity to discuss the impact that policies in the areas of taxation, wages and employment would have on the sustainability of the social security system.
The Greeek government is not alone, and the question is: can the troika — or key members of it — also be challenged legally. This post deals only with with the two European members of the troika: the ECB and the European Commission.
A legal challenge would need
(a) to identify the obligations that either of these bodies have that could be used in a legal challenge, and
(b) to identify how the legal challenge could be mounted — who has the right to take a case.
A number of legal obligations are potentially relevant. The key document here is the Lisbon Treaty. (An aside: after Lisbon, there are now essentially three fundamental legal documents governing the EU: (a) the Treaty on European Union (TEU); (b) the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), and (c) the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). They are available in a 408-page PDF here.)
The first obligation is set out in the TEU. The European Commission is required to “act within the limits of the powers conferred on it in the Treaties, and in conformity with the procedures, conditions and objectives set out in them” (Article 13(2) of the Treaty on European Union). It is that word “objectives” that provides the potential for action. Those objectives apply also to the ECB, so it is useful to summarise its obligations under Lisbon.
The basis for holding the ECB accountable is a little bit more convoluted, but gets to the same obligation. The ECB’s primary mandate under Lisbon is the objective of controlling inflation, and it has additional banking tasks concerning monetary policy, foreign exchange, etc. That mandate is set out in Article 127 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (emphasis added, original is on page no. C 83/102 of the PDF here) (thanks to Merijn Knibbe on the Real World Economics Review Blog for pointing this out):
Article 127
The primary objective of the European System of Central Banks (hereinafter referred to as ‘the ESCB’) shall be to maintain price stability. Without prejudice to the objective of price stability, the ESCB shall support the general economic policies in the Union with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Union as laid down in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union.
The point of the emphasis is that the ECB does indeed have a legal responsibility in relation to the objectives of the EU. The text on the ESCB points us to source of those objectives. The objectives set out in Article 3 cover both the neo-liberal economic free-market objectives and social objectives. Paragraph 3 of that Article contains the relevant text (page no. C 83/17), again with emphasis added:
3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance.
It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.
It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.
It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.
The second source of potentially useful obligations of the ECB and the European Commission is the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (it starts at page no. C 83/389 of the PDF here.)
The EUCFR has 54 articles, 50 of which set out human rights or principles. Since the right to social protection has already been the basis of a finding of a breach of human rights law in the Greek penioners’ cases, it would probably useful to use a similar basis for a legal challenge in the EU system. The relevant part of that article is as follows
Article 34
Social security and social assistance
1. The Union recognises and respects the entitlement to social security benefits and social services providing protection in cases such as maternity, illness, industrial accidents, dependency or old age, and in the case of loss of employment, in accordance with the rules laid down by Union law and national laws and practices.
[...]
It is important to acknowledge that the wording of Article 34 of the EUCFR is different from the wording of the related article, Article 12 of the Council of Europe’s European Social Charter, which was the basis of the Greek pensioners’ case against Greece. However, the explanations of the EUCFR (PDF here) make clear that Article 34 EUCFR does draw on Article 12 ESC. Here is the relevant part of Article 12 of the ESC:
Article 12 – The right to social security
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social security, the Contracting Parties undertake:
1 to establish or maintain a system of social security;
2 to maintain the social security system at a satisfactory level at least equal to that required for ratification of International Labour Convention No. 102 Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security;
3 to endeavour to raise progressively the system of social security to a higher level [...].
Of course, the difference in the wording of the two legal texts could be a problem. The Greek pensioners’ case centred on paragraph 3 of the article they invoked: the requirement to progressively raise the system of social security to a higher level, which not found in the Article 34 EUCFR. However, as noted in yesterday’s post, the European Committee of Social Rights described the reductions imposed on pensioners in strong language: “the adopted measures risk bringing about a large scale pauperisation of a significant segment of the population”. And the European Committee of Social Rights also noted that this has been observed by various international organisations, and the Committee pointed to findings by the ILO, the European Court of Human Rights, and Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. Given the serious nature of the cuts, the strong language of the European Committee of Social Rights, and the range of other bodies it has drawn on in reaching its legal findings, there must be a strong presumption that the situation is also a breach of the Article 34 of the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights, even if the exact point on raising the system of social security has not been transfered into the that EU Charter.
The final point to be made about the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights is that it applies to the European Commission and the ECB. The Charter makes that explicit:
Article 51
Field of application
1. The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the application thereof in accordance with their respective powers and respecting the limits of the powers of the Union as conferred on it in the Treaties.
[...]
However, the fact that the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights applies to two members of the troika in principle does not mean it necessarily applies in the specific circumstances of a particular situation. That will depend on examining the details of what exactly the two troika members have done, which is beyond the scope of this post.
I do not know if there is established EU case law on the when institutions are liable. Would the EU Court of Justice need to find that the two EU troika members directed that the particular cuts to Greek pensions be implemented before they would be liable to a finding of having breached either the Treaty on European Union or the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (or both)? Or would the EU Court find that although the Greek government had choices about how it would reduce its spending to comply with troika conditions for support, the two EU members of the troika are none the less liable because they had a responsibility to ensure that the cuts they demanded are not implemented in a way that breaches the rights of Greek citizens?
I am sure that an argument would be made by the EU bodies that since social welfare is primarily the responsibility of the Member States, and since the EU’s powers are severely limited to tasks that “support and complement the activities of the Member States” (Article 153 of the TFEU; PDF here), then the EU institutions cannot be held liable for any breaches of human rights in those areas. And I cite the situation of Greek pensioners only because there is a set of five cases with a legal finding that humn rights have been breached. It may be the case that the situation of a Portugese, Spanish, Cypriot or Irish citizen or group of citizens might make a more useful legal case against the ECB or European Commission. However, my objective is not to present a fully polished case, but to suggest how one might be constructed.
The final point that needs to be addressed is how to get a case to the EU Court of Justice. There are two ways of doing this. One is that a domestic case is taken, and referred by a national court to the EU Court of Justice for a ruling on preliminary questions. I do not know how you would construct a case like that to try to get a ruling against the ECB or European Commission.
A more useful approach, I think, lies in the powers of the European Parliament. Article 263 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) gives the European Parliament to bring action to have the acts of the European Commission and of the ECB reviewed for legality by the Court of Justice of the European Union. One of the bases on which the Parliament can legally challenge the ECB and European Commission are “infringement of the Treaties or of any rule of law relating to their application, or misuse of powers”. That power is constrained. There is a time limit of two months, which means the decisions that lead to the Greek penioners’ cases are well out of time. And a further point that would need to be examined is whether the specific actions by the ECB and the European Commission in their roles as members of the troika come within the term “acts [...] of the Commission and of the European Central Bank”.
I may be missing some key legal rules, but based on what I have read, I would like to see the European Parliament examine how it can use its powers to bring a legal case to ensure that the two EU members of the troika are required to ensure their actions comply with EU human rights law. The ideal outcome would be a judgment that the Commission and ECB have breached EU law because of the effect of the cuts they have a role in imposing. But even second-best outcomes would be a significant step forward. For example, I noted yesterday that the European Committee of Social Rights, the less-well known sibling to the European Court of Human Rights, found that the lack of analysis of the impact of cuts on Greek pensions was a breach of human rights.
The task now is for MEPs to use the resources they have available to them — research staff, legal experts, etc. — to identify suitable case and initiate proceedings. A preliminary step could be for some MEPs to seek to have the Greek pension cases examined by a parliamentary committee with a view to determining if the facts and finding give rise to a need for the Parliament to examine the acts of the Commission and the ECB in light of their Treaty obligations and their obligations under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
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Posted by Tomboktu in Social Policy, Unions, Human Rights, Austerity.
This is the first of two posts on the topic of austerity and human rights. Today I report on a recent set of five cases taken against Greece. Tomorrow, I examine the possibility of applying EU law to challenge the way in which austerity is imposed by the troika.
It would be a bit misleading to say that the Troika’s austerity packages breach human rights law. What can be said, though, is that, in five legal challenges, pension cuts in Greece imposed as part of the austerity package have been found to be in breach of European human rights law.
Three weeks ago, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR), a less-well known sibling to the European Court of Human Rights, published its rulings in the five cases challenging cuts to pensions.
The cuts are deep and wide-ranging. They are also complex because the apply to different pension schemes and pensioners of different statuses. I will not list all of the cuts here, but the approach and severity is indicated by the following three points made by the complainant trade unions:
- pension payments have been reduced by between 50 and 70 percent, depending on the professional category (see paragraph 57 of Decision 76/2012);
- pensioners under 55 years old with a pension of less that €1,000 [per month] suffered a 40 percent cut (paragraph 58); and
- auxilliary pensions have been reduced by approximately 30 percent.
The Greek government tried to argue that the cuts were necessary because of its obligations to the troika. The ECSR rejected that line of argument.
With regard to the observation made by the Government to the effect that the rights safeguarded under the 1961 Charter have been restricted pursuant to the Government’s other international obligations, namely those it has under the loan arrangement with the EU institutions and the International Monetary Fund, the Committee considers that the fact that the contested provisions of domestic law seek to fulfil the requirements of other legal obligations does not remove them from the ambit of the Charter.
The five unions that brought the complaints alleged that the cuts that had been imposed on pensioners breached the rights of the pensioners under Article 12.3 of the European Social Charter. The ECSR also mentioned that Article 12.2 was relevant to the case:
Article 12 – The right to social security
With a view to ensuring the effective exercise of the right to social security, the Contracting Parties undertake:
[...]
2. to maintain the social security system at a satisfactory level at least equal to that required for ratification of International Labour Convention No. 102 Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security;
3. to endeavour to raise progressively the system of social security to a higher level;
[...]
The ECSR had three grounds for finding that Greece is breaching its human rights obligations. There is lots that legal scholars could say about the three bases for the finding, but some points are worth mentioning here.
The sharpest rebuke for the Greek government is in paragraph 81 of Decision 76/2012 (and repeated in paragraph 77 of the other four Decisions):
[...] the effects of the adopted measures risk bringing about a large scale pauperisation of a significant segment of the population [...]
‘Pauperisation’ is strong language for a legal body. The following may not be the language of a legal study but: the ECSR’s choice of word is a clear and vigorous attack on the Greek government’s policies.
Second, the ECSR also found that the measures
have been introduced in a manner that does not respect the legitimate expectation of pensioners that adjustments to their social security entitlements will be implemented in a manner that takes due account of their vulnerability, settled financial expectations and ultimately their right to enjoy effect[ive] access to social protection and social security
An interesting point in that text is that pensioners have expectations. They are important enough to mention twice: as “settled” and “legitimate financial”. Any cuts must take account of those expectations. If that approach is adopted by other legal bodies that interpret and apply human rights standards — such as the Court of Justice of the EU and national constitutional courts (the Supreme Court in Ireland) — then it would be a severe challenge to the zeitgeist, not just in pensions but in other economic relations too. For example, underlying thrust in current policy on pensions generally is to close defined-benefits schemes — schemes that allow expectations to which the ECSR has accorded protection — and move workers to defined contribution schemes, forcing workers to play the stock market with their savings for retirement. (And it is not just in pensions that expectations are under threat. The day after the ECSR published the five Greek decisions, the UK Chancellor was engaged in a battle with the House of Lords on legislation which would see worker’s employment rights reduced in exchange for shares — and the financial risks that go with that — in the companies they work for.)
Third, the ECSR found that the Greek Government
has not conducted the minimum level of research and analysis into the effects of such far-reaching measures that is necessary to assess in a meaningful manner their full impact on vulnerable groups in society. Neither has it discussed the available studies with the organisations concerned, despite the fact that they represent the interests of many of the groups most affected by the measures at issue
If the Greek government did not have access to research and analysis, then it is reasonable to assume that the troika did not have such research and analysis either, a point I return to in tomorrow’s post. It is a basic point about making any policy: knowing what the effect will be. This third finding also has a second point: the lack of discussion with the organisations concerned. This is in keeping a little-studied strand in the ECSR’s case-law, which it has mainly developed under Article 30 of the Revised European Social Charter, which concern the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion.
All of that prompts the question: what practical importance does this have? I do not know the standing of ECSR decisions in Greek domestic law, so I do not know what effect the decisions will have on the behaviour of the Greek government. I can say that if these had been Irish cases, the rulings would have meant little: although the decisions of the ECSR are binding on the State, in Ireland they have no legal effect in the State. That is, they do not change internal law and the Irish courts would not be bound by them if the citizens tried to use ECSR decisions to force the government to change its course. (The exceptions to this general rule are EU law and rulings and judgments of the European Court of Human Rights when they do not conflict with the Constitution.) In fact, under Article 45 of the Constitution, the Irish courts are prohibited from adjudicating on social policy. (Another possibility, which I do not know enough about, it that the right to private property in Article 43 might be used to fight a cut to a pension.) And there is little evidence — none that I know of — that the State changes its policy to comply with obligations under ECSR case-law. (A few months ago I was at a book launch where I met a senior civil servant who has responsibility for policy on a particular area covered by one aspect of ECSR law. Over the nibbles, I mentioned a ruling that affected Ireland. The civil servant said that when he first saw a note on the ruling circulated in his department, he was concerned, but he stopped worrying when he realised it was from the ECSR, and not the EU Court of Justice: “Strasbourg can’t fine us”.)
A final point is that the rulings of the ECSR do not apply to the EU and its institutions (or to EU member states by virtue of their membership of the EU). The role of the EU is important, because two parts of the troika — the European Commission and the ECB — are EU institutions. The question of how they might be brought to account is explored tomorrow.
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Posted by WorldbyStorm in Bioethics, Culture, Feminism, Irish Politics.
Jacky Jones in the Irish Times,former HSE regional manager of health promotion, is a voice of reason on a range of issues from private schools through to reproductive rights.
Unfortunately the Protection of Life during Pregnancy Bill 2013 will not protect or vindicate women’s reproductive rights. The name change – removing the word “maternal” from the title – means there is still ambiguity about whether the woman’s life or that of the foetus is prioritised. It is only a matter of time before another Irish woman asks the European Court of Human Rights to protect and vindicate her right to terminate a pregnancy because her health, as distinct from her life, is not protected by the proposed legislation. In the meantime, Irish women will have to rely on the kindness of strangers in the UK.
Very true.
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Posted by WorldbyStorm in Social Policy.
Here’s something to consider, something many of us will have felt intuitively to be correct, and here’s some more useful empirical evidence.
The study released on Wednesday by the [UK] Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) reveals that during the 17-month test period – when all false allegation cases were referred to the DPP – there were 5,651 prosecutions for rape and 111,891 for domestic violence in England and Wales.
By comparison, over the same timespan, there were only 35 prosecutions for making false allegations of rape, six for false allegations of domestic violence and three that involved false allegations of both rape and domestic violence.
Kay Starmer, QC, who was involved in the study, had a very balanced overview of it, noting that false rape allegations where they occurred were – self-evidently – devastating but also that these were far far from the norm. And I think most important is how this perception that there are a greater number of false allegations than there actually are feeds into pernicious approaches by the police and other services. Indeed Starmar argues that police ‘should not adopt an over-cautious approach’ because of fears that the allegations will be unfounded.
And there’s more, the retraction of rape allegations is not evidence that they did not take place, and in instances where there are sequential claims of rape these should not be disbelieved since those in vulnerable positions are often targeted precisely because they are vulnerable.
One of the most depressing aspects of the study is the evidence for increasing levels of domestic violence and particularly directed against young women between 16 and 19. Starmar comments:
“I have raised concerns about [the levels of] domestic violence prevalent among young people, in particular young girls aged 16 to 19 are probably now most at risk. We may have a new generation [suffering from such abuse]. I have no reason to think this problem is reducing.”
There’s no reason to think that much of the data found above isn’t matched in some form or fashion on this side of the Irish Sea.
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Posted by WorldbyStorm in Economy, Social Policy, Workers Rights.
From Slate, a map of states internationally that don’t require paid sick leave (this is on foot of extended sickness, not a few days – though the article doesn’t clarify that).
Amazing in its own way.
Reading the comments below the piece is kind of grim when one reads about people with one weeks vacation per annum, no holiday days and no sick days.
Or how about ‘paid maternity leave’… As one commentor noted for ‘none at all’, Swaziland, Papau New Guinea, Liberia and the USof A.
Put aside, for a second, the human misery involved. The obvious economic issue to me would be the problem of people arriving to work too ill to complete their tasks and infecting those around them.
Depressing and an indication of just how little a society will do in regard of basic workers rights when there’s no pressure to do anything. We discuss the end of the left a fair old bit for obvious reasons, but without sustained pressure rights can be overlooked, dismissed or removed. Or never exist in the first place.
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Posted by WorldbyStorm in Bioethics, Economy, Irish Politics, The Left.
A few days have passed since the SBP Red C poll was released. And that offers time to work through the reasons that it may have seen such significant changes for at least one of the parties. The headline figures were as follows:
Fine Gael 28% (down 6%), Labour 14% (up 1%), Fianna Fail 20% (up 1%), Sinn Fein 17% (NC), Green Party 3% (up 1%), Independents, United Left Alliance and Others 18% (up 3%).
And while all others were broadly within their pre-existing levels of support, it is the FG figure which is most striking. In the space of a month it lost 6 per cent and in doing so dipped below 30 per cent for the first time in a Red C poll. As Pat Leahy put it:
A month ago Fine Gael was untouchable – miles ahead of everyone else on 34 per cent. Not today. Unbelievably, having dropped by six points to 28 per cent, Fine Gael now sees, approaching in the rear view mirror, its old enemy: Fianna Fáil.
That may be overstating it, and yet, and yet, both parties are now 8 per cent apart. That’s the thing with Irish politics, the closeness of FF and FG in terms of what they offer to voters is such that there is some (not a huge amount) interchangeability in that vote. Leahy argues that the death of Savita Halappanavar is a motive force in all this. I think it is to a considerable extent. But it’s very difficult not to believe that a broader dissatisfaction with FG over various issue, plus more immediately the travails of the Minister of Health, have also fed into this and that the abortion issue was in part a means by which this dissatisfaction could be activated.
Leahy makes a further crucial point:
It’s also clear from today’s numbers that the public is a good bit less conservative than Fine Gael on the abortion issue.
It’s arguable that the rather vociferous ‘pro-life’ FG TDs have done their party no good at all and it will be instructive if they moderate their tone in the next while. I put up an interview with Harvey Milk at the weekend where he noted that often a perception of greater strength of right wing attitudes than actually exists can prevent progressives from acting. In the case of abortion that seems to be the case. It is true that the death of Savita Halappanavar brought home the realities facing women in this state for many, but it is also difficult to believe that there had not been a slower shift in public opinion on the matter, and I think purely on an anecdotal level from my own perspective of hearing people on the matter – with all the necessary caveats – I would see that as being probably accurate.
Of course that doesn’t mean there’s a contradiction in all this. It could well be that despite all that FG remains a lot more conservative on the issue, that it is not tagging along after a perceived public opinion, but that its representatives are genuinely attached to much more conservative positions. It’s certainly telling to see names like Brian Hayes placed in the ‘pro-life’ camp.
The irony is that if the FG vote is a form of political collateral damage in respect of abortion legislation then it is truly a case of a party playing it safe and being undercut by changing public opinion – and a further irony, it is not economically linked.
That said on that latter matter Leahy makes a most interesting observation:
Public opinion has also shifted on the budget. Whereas previous surveys tended to show that the public was more in favour of public spending cuts than higher taxes, today’s poll shows that opposition to cuts in welfare payments, especially pensions, is shared by two-thirds of voters. However, a similar proportion (67 per cent) say that tax increases for higher earners – defined as those with over €100,000 household income – should be the first option for the government.
Voters favour further public sector pay cuts, rather than cuts to welfare and pensions, with a fifth of voters (21 per cent) saying it should be the first option, while over half (55 per cent) say it should be an option considered by the government. Just 20 per cent say the option of “higher taxes for all” should be considered, though a similar proportion say it should not be on the agenda at all.
One could dismiss all that as being a case that ‘anyone but us’ should be taxed or should have their wages cut, on the part of voters. But an appetite to increase higher taxes on those better off is at least moving in the right direction.
And he concludes by suggesting:
Overall, this poll shows not just political support but the political landscape moving away from the government parties. It’s not altogether clear what might replace this. But it does remind us of the underlying volatility that the economic crisis has wrought on Irish politics. The crisis has already changed our politics to an historic degree. That change is not necessarily at an end.
That’s the thing. As was put elsewhere, FF is positioning itself to the right of SF and to the left, marginally, of the Government. That may reap dividends, and already it is six points above where it was in similar polling half a year ago. All FF wants is to recover lost ground, as much and as fast as it can. So it will do literally anything to achieve that end. No more the chatter about FF becoming a niche right wing party that we heard in the aftermath of the election. Their ambitions are much much bigger than to be a PD redux. But it could be that their rather minor gain is because others have made the running in this – indeed a not dissimilar dynamic could explain why SF haven’t improved upon their position, given the very public and rather unusual – for them – apostasy from the party line on this particular issue.
Look at the Independents and Others who are up to 18 per cent. What remains striking is how the supposedly impotent and irrelevant Independents and Others continue to command a vast share of the vote. Yet if anything the recent events have shown how even given near non-existent political power they retain an ability to shape the discourse and in ways that are both positive for themselves and immensely damaging to their rivals. Again it seems reasonable to propose that this is a function of the most recent events, and particularly the high profile of Clare Daly, and Joan Collins and Mick Wallace in matters (a lot is made of the fact that those involved mention each others names a lot, but it would seem to be an approach that is not without merit if one wishes to solidify the Independent and Others vote share).
In a way what all this reminds me of is the way that when the opportunity arrived for voters to turn their backs on the Fianna Fáil and the Green Party during the last government they did so and in droves. It’s as if there is a need for ‘permission’ in these matters, and once it is given, or rather taken, then that’s that. It’s not, as Leahy notes, that ‘these positions are set in stone’. FG could recover though I hesitate to use the word ‘easily’. But with so much bad news still in train… it may be that this is a key moment in the electoral cycle.
And a Budget tomorrow!
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Posted by WorldbyStorm in Economy, Social Policy, The Left.
Reading the article yesterday in the Irish Times that notes that:
WEALTHY PARENTS will be able to hand back the €140-a-month child benefit payment to the State if they wish, under new measures being drawn up by Government officials.
Child benefit is a universal welfare payment paid to all families with children, regardless of their financial circumstances.
What, though, is the definition of ‘wealthy’? Joan Burton, our Minister for Social Protection, hasn’t said what her definition is, but the following perhaps indicates the direction of her thoughts:
She has signalled support for a tax on child benefit for people who earn more than €100,000 a year, but said last month that it could take several years before it is introduced.
And how many families will that touch upon?
So, for example, the latest Revenue figures show there are almost 115,000 people earning more than €100,000.
But:
[Because Revenue and Department of Social Protection use different computer systems] there is no record of how many of these people receive child benefit payments.
But what is the problem – as some see it – with child benefit? Well, currently the payments are made ‘automatically to some 600,000 families every month. They cost the State about €2bn a year’. According to the Independent there are 1.1 million children who receive it. That averages out about €1,818 per child (that’s not entirely accurate due to variations in payment rates dependent upon whether a child is first/second or third and after but it will do for now).
If we were to remove that 115,000 plus cohort of those earning more than €100k entirely, and that’s absurd – not all of them will have children of CB age, or may not have children at all, then we’d theoretically save €209m, not to be sneezed at, but not an earth shaking amount. Assume that it’s sixty per cent of that cohort – still a complete stab in the dark – and the saving would be an even less earth shaking €125m, and that’s only if the entirety of the payment is done away with. If only half of it is paid over then the saving would be €62.5m. Even accepting the caveat noted above about variations in payment, in the context of €2bn a year that’s not a whole heap.
Last month Michael Martin made the following point in relation to the issue.
Fianna Fail leader Micheal Martin said that while no one would quibble with taxing child benefit for those earning €100,000, it would not have a “very significant impact”.
“It does suggest gesture politics,” he told RTE’s ‘This Week’.
But what would have a ‘very significant impact’? What are people seriously suggesting? Abolition of the payment for all but those on welfare or very low paid work? Can’t see that one flying anytime soon. Indeed Burton’s caution as regards the stuff about wages in excess of €100k shows just how tricky this issue is when it is shaped into policy responses.
And a lesser measure? The Independent has the following:
A repeat of the 10pc child benefit cut he introduced would bring the payment down by a further €14 to €124 and reduce the annual bill by €190m.
During last year’s general election campaign, Fine Gael budgeted for a cut in child benefit in its policies. But a direct cut would be politically difficult for Ms Burton and her Labour Party, which promised voters that it would prevent Fine Gael from doing this.
€190 million is – obviously – a greater chunk removed from the bill, but it’s still minimal enough (which isn’t to say that I’m ignoring the impacts, what I’m trying to do is work through what is going on here).
But I wonder is Martin letting the cat out of the bag, at least as regards ultimate proposals further down the line, ie the tapering off of CB as an universal payment for as the IT notes here are other proposals for rolling CB into other payments such as FIS.
The Department of Social Protection has prepared a detailed technical report on an “integrated” welfare payment, which would combine the family income supplement and child dependant allowance.
This follows a value-for-money review of child benefit, which highlighted the need to “rationalise” the current system of child income support payments and provide “more consistent” assistance to low-income families.
‘Rationalise’ is an expedient little word, isn’t it?
But from a position of one strongly in favour of universal benefits it seems to me that this may be an example of the limits of what is politically possible in an advanced capitalist society in terms of removal of social provisions. It’s not quite a third rail of Irish politics, but it’s close enough. And whatever happens it will if implemented be very interesting to see figures on how many people send back the payment.
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Posted by WorldbyStorm in Economy, Irish Politics, Social Policy, The Left.
The latest edition of the Phoenix in the piece on Rónán Mullen and where he might go were he to join a political party notes that ‘Fine Gael’s arch conservative younger generation appear more compatible bed fellows [than Fianna Fáil]’.
Perhaps so. Perhaps so.
There’s little question that there are some FG TDs who are vociferously right wing. In the past five years or so this was most evident on economic issues, but one curiosity of the present government is the way in which on social issues this is coming more to the fore. This may well be a function of coalition and the ‘lock’ on economic policy which has somewhat constrained FG (but let’s not overstate it – it’s not quite their way or the highway, but it’s certainly a lot more their way than that of the LP).
This raises the thought is, for example, Lucinda Creighton too right wing for some Fine Gael voters? I only ask on foot of the thoughts of someone I was talking to last week who noted that given the make up of Dublin South-East in the past her interesting thoughts on issues social – gay marriage being an example, might not necessarily be vote winners there amongst the more socially liberal. Now granted she is a two time winner in the constituency, and now twice second to romp home. But it’s a puzzling trajectory she appears to be following, is it not?
Indeed the comments of others in FG who paint the party as ‘Christian Democrat’ and with much that that implies brings with it problems with sections of its support.
And the thought then strikes is there a deeper strategy on the part of the LP to try to accentuate such differences over the next while precisely to point up the distinctiveness between the two parties [FG and the LP], again given that both are locked into essentially the same economic approach where there is unlikely to be any great difference? For both parties while the outcome may be different the need is there.
On the other hand does Creighton hope to appeal to ex FF voters to take up the slack if there is a drift on the part of more socially liberal voters to the LP?
I’ve no conclusions at all about this, but just see this as yet another element of the chaos that makes up contemporary Irish politics.
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Posted by Tomboktu in Crime, Inequality, Justice, Society.
An Garda Síochána is conducting a public consultation as part of its preparation of a three-year strategy for 2013–2015. Have a look at how they frame the discussion with the first question in the consultation [the Gardaí use drop-down boxes with the numbers for ranking, but they don't transalte to CLR's website]:
An Garda Síochána has limited resources and is faced with a wide range of demands. In your opinion, what priority should An Garda Síochána give to the following policing areas? (Rank in order of priority – 1 being most important and 10 being least important. Each number can only be used once.)
Drugs (including importing, selling and taking drugs)
Public Order (for example, tackling drunkenness or rowdiness as well as anti-social behaviour)
Hate crimes (for example, targeting someone based on their race or sexuality)
Ensuring road safety (for example, preventing serious and fatal collisions, young people racing around in car etc)
Violent crimes (such as assaults rape, sexual assaults, and domestic violence)
Property crime (such as burglaries, thefts and robberies)
Criminal damage (for example, damage against your property, vehicle or graffiti)
Fraud (for example, computer and telephone scams or someone else using your identity without your knowledge)
Financial crimes committed by those working in businesses and large corporations.
Human Trafficking (for purposes of labour or sexual exploitation)
Now, even leaving aside the question of precisely how the responses to a public consultation will affect the choices the Gardaí make for priority areas (if, oh, 400,000 responses tell them they should make hate crimes based on race or sexuality the first priority, and the next highest priority is in the 100s of responses, will that put it to the top of the list?), isn’t that opening question just weird?
Financial crimes presented as a separate category from fraud. And young people racing around in car — is it different when middle-aged people do it? All of the compenents of the drug trade lumped together without distinguishing those with power in the trade from those without. Anti-social behaviour — when it is not a deliberate political action — would seem to me to always be wrong, but drunkeness — if I don’t get rowdy or drive a vehicle — might not be, but the Gardaí have put them in the same category.
I would like to know how they rank crimes where there are large numbers of potential and articulate “direct” victims (public order and property crime, for example) against crimes where the victims may indirect (the gardaí’s ‘financial crimes’) or smaller in number (hate crimes) or vulnerable (trafficking). And how do you rank any of the crime categories against the more-than-just-crime issue of road safety?
I live in an area where the Chief Superintendent has gone beyond the legal requirements for county-based Garda Joint Policing Committees and holds quarterly meetings with residents’ associations and other local community groups in each of the areas covered by the individual stations across the Division. And he takes seriously the two questions of listening to concerns raised and reporting back. [Complaints about dangerous parking outside seven schools in the school rush-hours resulted in this response at the following meeting: They had checked the issue at all schools, and in two cases they agreed that the situation was dangerous, but in the others, just an inconvenience for a short period. They met the two school principals, and a letter went out to all parents at the two schools. A week later, some garda shifts were changed to have officers in place at both rush hours -- that week, the gardaí spoke to drivers who tried to looked like they intended to park dangerously, told them to move on, and reminded the parents of the letter. The following week, the officers started issuing tickets, and 70 were issued in a month.]
At one of the meetings last year, the Superintendent presented statistics on garda activity in the station’s area. Among the data on speeding traps set up, speeding offences detected, drunk and disorderly outside pubs, burlaries, damage to property, etc. were two tables on drugs operations. One operation was implemented by the local drugs squad, and targeted local dealers. The other was an operation implemented by ‘beat’ and community gardaí and was targetted at the buyers. Up went a table showing the number of stops and searches in public spaces in the hunt to catch users with stock for their own use. That number over a year was in the high hundreds — I think it was between 700 and 800. But the total number of detections was in two digits. I made myself unpopular with a pair of questions: First, was it an effective use of resurces to stop and search so many people with so little crime detected for it? Second, what mechanisms did they have to ensure that the stops and searches did not work to alienating young men from the disadvantaged estates in the station’s area?
The current Garda national questionnaire does provide space to expalin your views, although some of the options you get appear to depend on the choices you make in previous questions. It would seem to be a bit difficult, but possible, to use the survey to present the kind of conerns I raised at the meeting. But I am minded to ignore some of the questions and say what I want to say anyway.
And in fairness, it is refreshing to get the opportunity to say that financial crimes need a bit more profile in the Gardaí’s work, although I am deeply uncomfortable having to rank that ahead or behind concerns like human trafficking or hate crimes.
If you would like to add your views, mosey on over to http://www.garda.ie/Controller.aspx?Page=9358
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