If the Irish army had entered the North in 1969… the difference between an invasion and an incursion.

It’s interesting how two pieces on the same topic can be quite widely divergent. Take an article in the Irish Times yesterday by Tom Clonan, Irish Times Security Analyst, which is entitled…‘Operation Armageddon’ would have been doomsday – for Irish aggressors. And then consider “No longer stand[ing idly] by’? Irish army contingency plans, 1969 -70 in the 1969 themed issue of History Ireland and written by Edward Longwill who has a doctorate from the University of Ulster. Because the message from the two is intriguingly different.

Let’s start with Tom Clonan’s piece. He suggests that…

The Defence Forces’ plans to invade Northern Ireland, which were drawn up 40 years ago as violence there erupted, display a mixture of enthusiasm and naivety that would have provoked massive retaliatory action from the British . . . had they been implemented

For almost 40 years, historians and political pundits have argued over the precise meaning of this provocative – and yet somewhat ambiguous phrase. Had Jack Lynch intended to convey the possibility of an Irish Army invasion of Northern Ireland – ostensibly to protect nationalists from sectarian attacks?

Unlikely as it may seem today, the Irish Army did indeed draw up secret plans to invade the six counties.

He continues:

In a secret Irish Army document, drawn up in September 1969 and entitled Interim Report of Planning Board on Northern Ireland Operations – the Irish military authorities explicitly outlined their concept for “feasible” military operations within the six counties.

In its opening paragraphs, the military document – seen by The Irish Times – predicts with considerable understatement that “all situations visualised [in this document] assume that military action would be taken unilaterally by the Defence Forces and would meet with hostility from Northern Ireland Security Forces”.

Let’s stop there for a moment. For this secret military document, seen by the Irish Times is so secret that I can find references to it not merely in the Longwill article in History Ireland, which we’ll come to in a moment or two, but also here on The Irish News (dating from August… 2004), on The Blanket (currently difficult to access, but archived by Google here and dating from September 2004) and last but not least here at the Irish Independent dating from January 2nd 2001 where it is made clear that the ‘secret military document’ was actually released publicly from national archives under the 30-year rule.

You will, I trust, agree, that such secretive information is extremely exciting. As are terms such as ‘aggressors’, etc. But perhaps less so when not exactly – well – secretive.

Clonan continues:

In other words, due to the prospect of confronting far superior forces and being exposed to “the threat of retaliatory punitive military action by UK forces on the Republic”, Irish military operations would of necessity commence unannounced – with no formal declaration of war.

And…

The document sets out various attack scenarios whereby the Irish general staff would seek to exploit the element of surprise to launch both covert unconventional or guerrilla-style operations against the British authorities, along with conventional infantry attacks on Derry and Newry.

Before elaborating in detail on the precise nature of such offensive operations within Northern Ireland, the authors of this secret document provide a health warning of sorts to their political masters.

At paragraph 4, a statement is made that “The Defence Forces have no capability of embarking on unilateral military operation of any kind . . . therefore any operations undertaken against Northern Ireland would be militarily unsound”.

However, despite this caveat, the document goes on to outline “accepting the implications of subparagraph 4a . . . conventional military operations on a small scale up to a maximum of company level and unconventional operations could be undertaken by the Defence Forces” – subject to such action being of short duration.

At paragraph 4, sub-paragraph g of this extraordinary document, the Irish Army goes on to identify the towns of “Derry, Strabane, Enniskillen and Newry” as most suitable for infantry operations “by virtue of their proximity to the Border” – and also by virtue of their predominantly nationalist demographics.

He also notes that:

At sub-paragraph h, the Irish military authorities identify the BBC TV studios in Belfast as a primary target for destruction along with “Belfast airport, docks and main industries . . . located in the northeast corner”. The document observes that due to their “distance from the Border . . . any military operations against these (targets) should preferably be of the unconventional type”.

The remainder of the 18 pages of secret documents dealing with “Northern Ireland Operations” and “Planning for and conduct of Border operations”, also seen by The Irish Times , deal with the steps necessary for the execution of specific – albeit limited – military operations against Newry, Derry and major infrastructural targets in Belfast.

Interestingly though, the Independent report from 2001 portrays this in a much less gung-ho light.

A document dated October 27 is headed “interim report of planning board on Northern Ireland operations”.

It gives the object as “to report on the feasibility of the Defence Forces undertaking military combat or support operations in Northern Ireland, including the nature and implications of such operations”. The board says that it “would have liked a clearly defined political objective”.

In the absence of such an objective the board considered a number of political situations each of which might suggest military intervention. Having stated that “there is no precise knowledge available … as to what the reaction of public opinion would be either North or South of the border,” it considers four possible situations: “attacks on the Catholic minority by Protestant extremists with which the Northern Ireland security forces cannot cope; conflict between the Catholic minority and the Northern Ireland security forces on civil rights issues; conflict between republican-nationalist elements (possibly supported by illegal elements from south of the border) and the Northern Ireland security forces; and conflict between Protestant extremists and Northern Ireland security forces not directly involving the minority.”

It asserts bluntly that “the Defence Forces have NO capability of embarking on unilateral military operations, of any kind (conventional or unconventional), from a firm base at home. This means, in effect, that were operations in any form to be launched into Northern Ireland we would be exposed to the threat of retaliatory punitive military action by United Kingdom forces on the Republic.

Therefore any operations undertaken against Northern Ireland would be militarily unsound.

The paper outlines a number of alternatives, such as “a wide range of unconventional operations in any part of Northern Ireland designed to draw forces off from the area of direct combat.”

It goes on to note that “a number of the courses suggested would involve support of and co-operation with various movements in Northern Ireland such as civil rights and republican groups.

“This could also lead to co-operation with illegal groups in the Republic. These contacts would have serious political implications on the national and international stage.

It is considered that the support and assistance of a substantial part of the minority would be essential for success in Defence Force operations in Northern Ireland.

The fact that active intervention by us in the North would expose the minority to retaliatory action could limit the amount of overt assistance they would be prepared to give.

“It would be necessary to confine conventional operations to those areas where there is a Catholic/nationalist majority. In minority areas, particularly Belfast, only unconventional operations could be conducted.

“It is considered also that it is to these latter areas that supplies of arms and equipment should be chiefly directed.”

The document, like subsequent papers, warns that involvement in Northern Ireland would lessen the Defence Forces’ ability to protect vital installations in the Republic.

You pays your money, you takes your choice which interpretation you find most credible.

Clonan argues that any Irish incursion would have been annihilated. Not an unreasonable proposition…

In terms of ground forces, in September 1969, the British army presence in Northern Ireland was already on high alert and consisted of almost 3,000 heavily armed troops of the 2nd Queens Regiment, the Royal Regiment of Wales and the Prince of Wales’s Own Regiment based in Belfast, Omagh and Derry. These units had – unlike their Irish counterparts – considerable experience and training in conventional large-scale combat tactics as part of Nato’s UK 16 Para Brigade.

Many of these units had just recently rotated to Northern Ireland following deployment as part of Europe’s Nato Northern Flank Mission.

Armed with Humber armoured personnel carriers – equipped with Rolls Royce six- cylinder engines – along with Saracen armoured fighting vehicles and overwhelming air superiority, the British army presence in Northern Ireland in the autumn of 1969 would have been more than capable of dealing decisively with any Irish Army incursion north of the Border.

Irrespective of the element of surprise, the Irish Army would have been subject to a massive British counter-attack – probably within hours of their initial incursion. Irish casualties would have been high as the British would have sought to swiftly and indiscriminately end the Republic’s unilateral military intervention – which would have had the potential to completely destabilise Northern Ireland, leading perhaps to the type of sectarian violence and ethnic cleansing seen in central Europe just two decades later.

And from the Irish military point of view…

At the time that this document was drafted, in September 1969, the Irish Army was seriously under-strength, with a total of 8,113 personnel. While individual troops were relatively well armed with FN 7.62 automatic rifles – purchased for service in the Congo – the Irish Army was severely lacking in transport and other support elements necessary for combat operations, however limited in scale.

However, the Irish had little or no air support – the Air Corps possessed approximately a half dozen serviceable De Havilland Vampire jets in the autumn of 1969. These aircraft would have been of little use against RAF Phantom and Harrier jets, stationed at that time within a very short flight time from Northern Irish air space. [small pedantic point of detail, the first Harrier squadron was only declared to the RAF order of battle on 1st of January 1970 and as far as I can make out they were in training in August/September 1968 – still, Phantom’s, and Lightnings and other jets, would have been bad enough – wbs].

Of course that depends on the political context within which an incursion was framed. And here Longwills article is most interesting. For under the heading Justifiable intervention or an illegal invasion? he writes…

Under international law, sending a military force into another sovereign state without that state’s permission is classified as an illegal invasion. A UN peacekeeping force cannot enter a member state’s territory unless that state has given prior consent. Furthermore, Britain could have vetoed a UN decision as a member of the Security Council.

He continues…

Even if the UN ruled Britain as a party to the dispute, neutralising its veto, the Cold War alliance between Britain and the US would most likely have seen the US veto decisions on Britain’s behalf. The Irish governemnt astutely recognised that Irish military intervention could only be internationally justified in the event of a total breakdown of law and order in Northern Ireland. Under these circumstances Irish intervention could not be labelled as an assault on British sovereignty. On the contrary, the Irish government could have successfully claimed that it authorised cross-border operations primarily for humanitarian reasons in response to Britain’s failures under humanitarian law.

Okay. So, all depended upon the political context. Clearly, and self-evidently, as argued by the Irish Army there was no military possibility for victory. And this tallies with something else Longwill points out…

The Irish government’s contemplation of military intervention never involved the question of partition. Assessments and contingencies developed in response to humanitarian concerns. As Jack Lynch accurately told an emotional FF Árd Fheis in 1970, the Irish army did not have the means to intervene, and his policy in relation to partition was to seek unity by consent.

Longwill argues that:

An Irish army incursion into Northern Ireland would have ended in two possible ways: either withdrawal or total destruction. The most likely British response would have been the issuing of a withdrawal ultimatum.

But note the word he uses, ‘incursion’. His reading of the Interim Report, that most secret of documents, is such that it leads him to state…

Military planners viewed intervention with clear apprehension and knew that an incursion without an attainable political objective would be counter-productive to Irish interests. They recognised the difficulty of justifying an incursion and realised that internationally the Republic of ireland might be seen as an aggressor, with negative political and public opinion influencing the ‘outcome of any operations undertaken’…

And he then describes the four intervention scenarios which would undercut such claims of aggression.

He also argues that ‘they knew an incursion beyond the immediate border area was completely out of the question. The army assessors produced a realistic report of what the small, under-strength and under-equipped Irish military could accomplish – a brief, limited, short-term incursion across the border.

But as Longwill argues, a year later Minister of Defence Jim Gibbons was careful to note in the February Directive of 1970 which ordered the army to ‘train and prepare’ for an incursion, that…

…intervention would only occur in the event of a complete breakdown of law and order in Northern ireland, and the only objective would be to protect the life and property of civilians. Clearly intervention would only be authorised in the event of genocide or medium-scale expulsions of Catholics.

And Longwill cuts to the heart of the issue when he notes;

The Irish government’s criteria for an incursion were nightmarish-the army would only cross the border if Northern ireland were so severely destabilised that Irish entry would not cause further destabilisation.

At such a point, presumably, the idea was that the British Army would itself have been overwhelmed by the events on the streets. A situation that potentially might have occurred in the event of a Bosnia like scenario.

And humanitarian concerns are central to this. Even at this point, and one can read it expressed in the documentation from August and September 1969, the IRA and Sinn Féin envisaged a process of disengagement and withdrawal by Britain, not an appropriation from the South.

Of course, to place it in this political context of humanitarian concerns, of short lived incursions to – perhaps – at most relieve nationalists populations in areas close to the border, is much less dramatic than to talk of ‘invasion’, ‘agressors’ and armageddon.

Would an Irish army incursion outside the constraints detailed here have been of benefit? It’s hard to see how precisely, in that it would perhaps have triggered the very events it was meant to forestall. The problem though was never military, since long after the time that any incursion had ended (short of catastrophic collapse of state institutions on the Northern side of the Border) the fundamentals would have remained in place. But then the problem was never that the South was disengaged militarily from the North, but that it was disengaged politically, not even willing to take up its responsibilities to those populations who looked to it for support across the many decades of Stormont and after – and an intriguing counterfactual is one where the Free State and later the Republic of Ireland actually sought to carve out from the off a political space where they exerted and maintained an influence on the North. In any event, one could posit that, almost as ever with regard to the North, the military was the distraction from the political.

Clonan concludes his piece by suggesting that:

Luckily for the Irish Republic – and the people of Northern Ireland – Lynch’s declaration not to stand by never translated into a declaration of war.

True indeed, but since the purpose of this exercise was never to do any such thing, even had it been implemented, which it wasn’t in any detail, it does seem to miss the point. And the point is that such feints, even in their rhetorical form, were not about war.

There’s more on this tonight, as the IT notes:

What if Lynch had invaded? A documentary on the consequences of an Irish invasion of Northern Ireland in September 1969 will be screened tomorrow on RTÉ 1 television at 9.30pm